Friday, April 03, 2020

[Essay] Clark and Zen: On the Untenability of D. T. Suzuki’s Theory of Knowledge

Note: This Essay was drafted in 2017. A pdf version of this Essay is available: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1XZznoQ5TFOnKXlbvwcFc38NRjzGkoTQK?usp=sharing

 
Contents

A. Introductory Remarks
1. Introduction
2. Locating Gordon Clark within Christianity
3. Locating D. T. Suzuki within Buddhism
4. The Religious Context of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki's Epistemologies

B. The First Epistemological Strand: The A-Rational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's Theory
5. The Rejection of Concepts by D. T. Suzuki
6. The First Non-Conceptual Paradox: Truth
7. The Second Non-Conceptual Paradox: Logic
8. The Third Non-Conceptual Paradox: Language
9. The Nature of D. T. Suzuki's Second-Order Discourses
10. A Summary Contrast of Three Positions on Concepts

C. The Second Epistemological Strand: The Irrational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's Theory
11. Epistemological versus Ontological Objects of Knowledge
12. D. T. Suzuki Rejects the Subject-Object Distinction Because of Monistic Pantheism
13. The Satori Experience as a Perfect Being Theory of Knowledge
14. A Criticism of D. T. Suzuki's Theory of Satori Experience

D. The Hu Shih – D. T. Suzuki Exchange of 1953
15. Introducing the 1953 Exchange
16. Is Zen Buddhism Irrational?

E. A Clarkian Explanation of the A-Rationality and Irrationality of the Epistemology of D. T. Suzuki
17. Twenty-Four Theses of a Clarkian Theory of Knowledge
18. Some Implications of a Clarkian Theory for How Human Persons Know
19. A Fundamental Disagreement with D. T. Suzuki's Theory of Knowledge

F. Conclusion

References



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Clark and Zen: On the Untenability of D. T. Suzuki’s Theory of Knowledge

Benjamin Wong


"You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free." (John 8:32)


A. Introductory Remarks

1. Introduction

This essay is a partial discharge of the intellectual debt I owe to Gordon H. Clark (1902-1985). In my youth, after I became a Christian, I have thought about Chan Buddhism. But later, through reading the writings of Clark, I became convinced that Chan Buddhism is untenable. The following is my explanation why.

For specificity, D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966) is selected for exposition, contrast, and criticism. This is for three reasons. First, Suzuki is instrumental in spreading Zen Buddhism to the West. Second, Suzuki has written many books and essays in English, which lessen the danger of misinterpretation when quoting him. And third, like Gordon Clark, Suzuki is not only a scholar but a practitioner of his religion. Evidencing this third point, the longtime editor of many of Suzuki's books, Christmas Humphreys (1901-1983), has written: "Dr Suzuki writes with authority. Not only has he studied original works in Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese and Japanese, but he has an up-to-date knowledge of Western thought in German and French as well as the English which he speaks and writes so fluently. He is, moreover, more than a scholar; he is a Buddhist. Though not a priest of any Buddhist sect, he is honoured in every temple in Japan, for his knowledge of spiritual things, as all who have sat at his feet bear witness, is direct and profound. When he speaks of the higher stages of consciousness he speaks as a man who dwells therein, and the impression he makes on those who enter the fringes of his mind is that of a man who seeks for the intellectual symbols wherewith to describe a state of awareness which lies indeed 'beyond the intellect'. " (Suzuki [1949] 2000, 11)

Both Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki are profound thinkers. This essay can only focus on one aspect of their works: epistemology or the theory of knowledge. The method employed is that of the presuppositionalism of Gordon Clark – the truth of the Holy Bible and of Clark's theology and philosophy will be assumed and with them the Zen Buddhism of D. T. Suzuki will be critically engaged. For this essay, the question of how representative Suzuki is of either Japanese Zen or Chinese Chan will not be considered. The analysis of Suzuki will consist of two related epistemological strands. The first strand is concerned with concepts (objects of conception) and consists of three points: (a) Suzuki rejects concepts. (b) Since truth, logic, and language are conceptual, the rejection of concepts leads to paradoxes in these areas. (c) Since rationality requires conceptual judgment using truth claims, logic, and language, the rejection of concepts leads to what appears to be irrationality but is in fact a-rationality. The second strand is concerned with percepts (objects of perception), or more generally, experiences as the epistemological objects of knowledge. In Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, the satori (enlightenment or sudden awakening) experience maybe construed as an experience based perfect being theory. There is a drive towards omniscience even when satori is considered as an experience of finite beings. These two strands render Suzuki's epistemology both false and untenable. In contrasts with Suzuki, Gordon Clark's epistemology, for reasons to be briefly explained later, is immune from these criticisms.

Before we move on to epistemology, the next two sections will provide some historical backgrounds on Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki. The backgrounds are meant to caution the readers about two things: (a) The limited scope of this essay. This essay does not seek to refute Zen Buddhism from a conservative Christian viewpoint but only to explain why the epistemology of D. T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism is untenable. (b) Although he stands in the Japanese Zen tradition, D. T. Suzuki may not be taken as representative of all Chinese Chan or Japanese Zen. Readers are cautioned not to assume that everything of Chan or Zen Buddhism will automatically apply to Suzuki, and vice versa. Buddhism and its Zen varieties have a history no less complex than Christianity. As one cannot assume that since both Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin are Christians therefore their theologies are the same, so also one cannot assume that since Japanese Zen originated from Chinese Chan therefore they are the same. And so it is also between D. T. Suzuki's version of Zen Buddhism and the other varieties of Chan and Zen.


2. Locating Gordon Clark within Christianity

Christianity is historically divided into two branches: Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. The Protestantism churches were separated from Roman Catholicism during the Reformation. The formal principle of the Reformation is sola scriptura – the Bible is the only infallible rule for faith and practice. The material principle of the Reformation is sola fide – justification is by faith alone and excludes all works. There are four major branches of Protestantism: Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican, and Anabaptist. Gordon Clark is a protestant philosopher and theologian in the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition.

The chief characteristic of Gordon Clark's philosophy is that it is an extension of his theology. The chief characteristic of Clark's theology is that it regards the Bible is the Word of God and therefore inerrant in the autographs. Since the Bible is the Word of God, what God claims in the Bible as true is true. The methodology of Clark's theology and philosophy is to start with the truth claims of the Bible as true and to use logic to deduce what one can from the Bible. Since deductive logic is truth-preserving, one arrives at truths from truths. The chief concept in Clark's philosophy and epistemology is therefore truth.

There are certain characteristics of truths that are prominent in Clark's philosophy:

(a) Truths are propositional.

(b) Truths are coherent and do not contradict each other.

(c) Some truths imply other truths and therefore truths form a system of interrelated propositions.

Gordon Clark's philosophy is an extension of his Biblical theology. Although a philosopher by profession, Gordon Clark is a theologian and Bible scholar at heart. An inspection of Clark's bibliography reveals that he has not only written books in philosophy, but also books on theology and commentaries on the Bible.

The theological system that Gordon Clark regards as most faithful to the Bible is Reformed theology or Calvinism. In Clark's view, the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), a Reformed confession, is the most accurate summary of the truth claims of the Bible. Clark has written two commentaries on the Westminster Confession of Faith (cf. Clark 1956 and 1965). Since truths do not contradict each other and since some truths imply others, in developing his philosophy Clark uses the Bible and Reformed theology as both premises and control. As premises, the Bible is use to deduce philosophical claims. As control, any philosophical claims that is inconsistent with the Bible is regarded as false. Reformed theology functions similarly to the Bible in forming philosophical claims but as a subordinate standard to the Bible. Since the Bible functions as premises in Clark's philosophy, it is also known as Scripturalism.


3. Locating D. T. Suzuki within Buddhism

Like Christianity, there are different "branches" and "schools" within Buddhism. The two major branches of Indian Buddhism are Theravada and Mahayana. Theravada seeks the enlightenment of individual sentient beings while Mahayana seeks the enlightenment of all sentient beings. Chan Buddhism is a Chinese indigenous version of Mahayana Buddhism with special developments in "meditation". The Sanskrit "Dhyana" means "meditation" and is transliterated into Chinese as 'Chan' and Japanese as 'Zen'.

The first patriarch of Chinese Chan is the Indian monk Bodhidharma. According to legends, Bodhidharma traveled by sea and reached present day Guangzhou in China in the early sixth century and achieved enlightenment after nine years of meditation at a cave near Shaolin Monastery on Mount Song. Chan Buddhism valued lineage and orthodox transmission was symbolized by the passing on of the "robe and bowl of dharma" from generation to generation.


Table 1: The First Six Patriarchs of Chan Buddhism


Patriarch Chinese Principal Text
(1) Bodhidharma (c.440–c.528) 菩提達摩 Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經)
(2) Huike (487-593) 慧可 " "
(3) Sengcan (d.606) 僧燦 " "
(4) Daoxin (580-651) 道信 " "
(5) Hongren (601-674) 弘忍 " "
(6) Huineng (638-713) 惠能 Diamond Sutra (金剛經)


There was a division of Chan Buddhism into two schools after the fifth patriarch: The Northern School and the Southern School. The official Chan lineage was transmitted through the Southern School. In Chinese Buddhism, only a record of (or a commentary on) the teachings of the Buddha can be called a "sutra ()". The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (六祖壇經) is the only Chinese composed text that is honored by being titled as a "sutra".


Table 2: The Two Schools of Chan Buddhism


School Founder Student of Distinctive
Northern Chan Shenxiu (神秀) (c.606-706) Hongren (601-674) Gradual enlightenment over time
Southern Chan Huineng (惠能) (638-713) Hongren (601-674) Sudden enlightenment at a point in time


Meditation belongs to all schools of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana. Chan became a distinct tradition of Chinese Buddhism through the efforts of the six Patriarchs and the Northern and Southern Schools. The Sixth Patriarch Huineng (638-713) discontinued the practice of passing on the "robe and bowl of dharma" as a symbol of orthodox transmission and Chan Buddhism thereafter was divided into many "denominations". Huineng has many notable students of which I will mention three and many later Chan schools traced their lineage to only the first two of them. Important in history of the later Chan schools are the "Five Houses and Seven Schools". The importance of Shenhui (684-758) lies in that through political intrigue, he established his teacher Huineng as the Sixth Patriarch and the Southern School as orthodox.


Table 3: Three Students of the Sixth Patriarch Huineng (638-713)


Students of Huineng (638-713) Chinese
Xingsi of Qingyuan (660-740) 青原行思
Huairang of Nanyue (677-744) 南嶽懐譲
Shenhui of Heze (684-758) 菏澤神會


Table 4: Five Houses of Chan Buddhism that Originated in Tang Dynasty (618-907)


House Founder(s) Lineage
Guiyang School (溈仰宗) Lingyou of Guishan (溈山靈祐) (771-854) 3rd generation descendant of Huairang

Huiji of Yangshan (仰山慧寂) (807-883) Student of Lingyou
Linji School (臨濟宗) Yixuan of Linji (臨濟義玄) (d.866) 4th generation descendant of Huairang
Caodong School (曹洞宗) Liangjie of Dongshan (洞山良價) (807-869) 4th generation descendant of Xingsi

Benji of Caoshan (曹山本寂) (840-901) Student of Liangjie
Yunmen School (雲門宗) Wenyan of Yunmen (雲門文偃) (864-949) 6th generation descendant Xingsi
Fayan School (法眼宗) Fayan Wenyi (法眼文益) (885-958) 8th generation descendant of Xingsi


Table 5: Two Schools that Originated in Song Dynasty (960-1279) that are Branches of Linji School


School Founder Lineage
Yangqi School (楊岐派) Fanghui of Yangqi (楊岐方會) (992-c.1049) 7th generation descendant of Yixuan of Linji
Huanglong School (黃龍派) Huinan of Huanglong (黃龍慧南) (1002-1069) 7th generation descendant of Yixuan of Linji


Although there were many cultural exchanges between China and Japan during the Tang dynasty (618-907) and Chan Buddhism was among them, Japanese Zen did not become established until the Kamakura period (1185-1333) of the Kamakura shogunate, the first of three shogunates in Japan. There were no major developments in Japanese Buddhism between the Kamakura period and the time of D. T. Suzuki. According to Suzuki, "After the Kamakura period, down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1867), which meant roughly six hundred years of peace and uneventful life for Buddhism, there was nothing that could stimulate the growth of new life in it except that the new schools of the Kamakura period continued to flourish." (Suzuki 1958, 103)

There are presently three major Zen sects in Japan: Soto school, Rinzai school, and Obaku school. Soto is the Japanese line of Caodong, Rinzai is the line of Linji (mainly through the Yangqi school), and Obaku is the line of a later variant of Linji. ('Soto' and 'Caodong' transliterated the Chinese characters '曹洞'; 'Rinzai’ and 'Linji' transliterated the characters '臨濟'.)

Although never become a Buddhist monk, D. T. Suzuki received his Zen training in the Rinzai temple Engaku-ji in the city of Kamakura under master Shaku Soen. "Having trained intensively in Rinzai Zen with a series of teachers from the 1880s until the death of his primary teacher, Shaku Sōen (1860–1919), Suzuki wrote about the world through the lens of Rinzai Zen, which, despite its problems in the twentieth century, remained for Suzuki the reservoir of true Buddhist understanding and insight." (Jaffe 2014, xii) The hitting and other uses of force refer to in some later quotations of Suzuki's are distinctive of Linji Chan or Rinzai Zen and those influenced by them.


4. The Religious Context of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki's Epistemologies

The focus of this essay is on the epistemology or theory of knowledge of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki. Although meant to be general, their epistemologies are developed within the context of their religions. The following Table summarizes the religious problems against which their respective epistemology is developed.


Table 6: The Basic Religious Problems of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki



Gordon Clark D. T. Suzuki
Worldview Christian Theism Pantheism
Religion Reformed Protestantism Zen Buddhism
Problem Sin against God Sufferings
Nature of the Problem Moral Moral
Solution Atonement by Jesus Christ Enlightenment
Nature of the Solution Moral Epistemological
Method Justification by Faith alone Satori Experience


Christian Theism is the worldview that the personal God of the Holy Bible exists and that He has created the world. Pantheism is the worldview that the world is God. Christmas Humphreys recorded a conversation he had with D. T. Suzuki: "He taught me in one remark what Zen is not, and gave a hint of what it is. We were discussing Buddhism as pantheism. 'I see what you mean,' I said, 'all is God but there is no God.' 'No,' he said, after the usual moment's thought. 'It would be better to say, "All is God and there is no God." ' " (Humphreys 2000, xii) The second conjunct, "there is no God", of course, is to deny the existence of the Christian God.

Both "faith" and "satori experience" are essentially epistemological although the epistemologies involved are very different. Where the object of knowledge in Gordon Clark's epistemology is truth or proposition, in D. T. Suzuki's epistemology it is experience.


B. The First Epistemological Strand: The A-Rational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's Theory

5. The Rejection of Concepts by D. T. Suzuki

The chief characteristic of D. T. Suzuki's epistemology is its rejection of concepts. There are three basic epistemological powers of the human mind: sensation, perception, and conception. Sensation is the detection of internal or external stimulation. Perception is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensation in order to represent and understand the sensory information. Conception is the formation of beliefs about ourselves and the world. Conception may be about our sensations and perceptions, but is not limited to them as such. The rejection of concepts makes Suzuki's theory of knowledge a-rational.


6. The First Non-Conceptual Paradox: Truth

Since truth is conceptual and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts in his epistemology, Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot make any genuine truth claims and cannot appraise any propositions as either true or false. What appears to be truth claims are considered by Suzuki to be verbalism for convenience.

(Suzuki [1950] 1991, 20):

"If we are to judge Zen from our common-sense view of things, we shall find the ground sinking away from under our feet. Our so-called rationalistic way of thinking has apparently no use in evaluating the truth or untruth of Zen. All that we can therefore state about Zen is that its uniqueness lies in its irrationality or its passing beyond our logical comprehension. It is true that religion has generally something that is not to be grasped by mere logic, and appeals to a revelation or acceptance by faith. For instance, the existence of God, who has created the world out of nothing, is not logically provable or experientially demonstrable, and is to be accepted by faith. But Zen's irrationality does not seem to be of the same order as the religious irrationality, so called."

It is infelicitous when Suzuki wrote that the uniqueness of Zen "lies in its irrationality". The reason Zen is "passing beyond our logical comprehension" is not because it is irrational, but because its epistemology rejects concepts and operates on experiences such as sensation and perception only. Tried to empty your mind of all concepts and then tried to understand yourself and the world with sensation and perception only and you will have a taste of the Zen experience. A better description of this theory is "a-rational".

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 22):

"Now, the monk who asked this question wished to know if there were anything specifically to be known as the truth of Zen, which is absolutely beyond human understanding. The four propositions are: (1) affirmative, (2) negative, (3) neither affirmative nor negative, and (4) both affirmative and negative. The 'one hundred negations', which in fact refers to the one hundred and six negative statements in the Lankavatara sutra, means a wholesale negation of all possible statements that can be made of anything."

In a two-valued logic, the four propositions exhaust all possible affirmations and denials of a proposition. If you said to a Zen master that the rose in front of you is red, and the Zen master replied that it is the case that: (1) The rose is red, (2) The rose is not red, (3) The rose is neither red nor not red, and (4) The rose is both red and not red, then the Zen master is not being irrational. The paradoxical claims by the Zen master are meant to convey the idea that reality is non-conceptual and therefore all four propositions are true (or not true).

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 24):

"There is no doubt that the Zen method of dealing with its subjects is unique in the history of thought. It makes no use of ideas or concepts; it directly appeals to concrete experience. If the monk fails to awaken in himself the consciousness of the truth thus conveyed in the most practical, personal, and lively manner, he has to wait for another opportunity. In the meantime he may go on roaming in the wilderness of abstract thought."


7. The Second Non-Conceptual Paradox: Logic

Since logic is conceptual and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts in his epistemology, Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot use any genuine logical argumentation and cannot appraise any arguments as either valid or invalid. What appears to be logical argumentation are considered by Suzuki to be verbalism for convenience.

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 26-27):

"Another unique factor in the Zen method of teaching is what is known as mondo. The disciple asks a question (mon) and the master answers (to or do), but sometimes this is reversed; and the answer is not always given in words. For this questioning and answering is carried on in the region of concrete thinking, and not in that of abstraction and ratiocination. There is no lengthy exchange of words between master and disciple, no discursive argument. The mondo generally stops with the master's pithy, epigrammatic statement, or his physical display of force, and never leads to a serial development of logical subtleties. If the disciple should fail to comprehend the master at once, he beats a retreat, and that is the finish of the personal interview."

"Zen never commits itself to conceptualization; it lives in aesthetic or intuitive apprehension, and its truth is always demonstrated by means of personal contact, which is the signification of mondo. The knocking down, or the slapping of the face, or other various acts of 'rudeness' or violence, are the outcome of the personal contact. It may appear strange that the understanding of Zen issues out of these deeds, but as long as Zen is not based on logical reasoning and conceptual persuasion, its understanding must come from the personal experience itself, and it must be understood that by personal experience is meant not only the experience of the sense-world but that of events taking place in one's psychological realm."

Suzuki ([1953] 1955, 152-3):

"When the gist of these Zen mondo is replaced more or less by modern phraseology, we may have something like the following:"

"We generally reason: 'A' is 'A' because 'A' is 'A'; or 'A' is 'A', therefore, 'A' is 'A'. Zen agrees or accepts this way of reasoning, but Zen has its own way which is ordinarily not at all acceptable. Zen would say: 'A' is 'A' because 'A' is not 'A'; or 'A' is not 'A'; therefore, 'A' is 'A'."

"Our thinking on the worldly level is: Everything has its cause; nothing is without its cause; the causation works on and in all things. But Zen will agree with some Christians when they declare that God created the world out of nothing, or that God willed and the world came into existence, or that 'To say that God created the world yesterday or tomorrow would be foolishness, for God created the world and everything in it in the one present Now.' "

"Mathematics has this: 0=0, 1=1, 1+1=2, and so on. Zen has these too, but it has no objection to the following either: 0=1, 0=2, 1 +1=3, etc. Why? Because zero is infinity and infinity is zero. Is this not irrational and beyond our comprehension?"

These paradoxical claims in logic and mathematics by Suzuki's are not that paradoxical if one remembers that according to Suzuki, reality is non-conceptual and therefore a-rational. Since reality is a-rational, we can verbally talk about reality in either a rational or an irrational way. The verbal talks are not meant to make genuine truth claims about reality but are verbalism for convenience.


8. The Third Non-Conceptual Paradox: Language

Since spoken and written languages are conceptual and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts in his epistemology, Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot use any spoken and written languages to make genuine truth claims, logical arguments, or to communicate conceptual information. What appears to be spoken and written languages are considered by Suzuki to be verbalism for convenience.

Suzuki ([1949] 1991, 15):

"The original idea of Hui-neng was, of course, to do away with verbalism and literature, because Mind can only be comprehended by mind directly and without a medium."

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 17-18):

"A gardener-monk once approached the master and wanted to be enlightened on Zen. The master said, 'Come again when there is nobody around, and I’ll tell you what it is.' The following day the monk came in again, observed that there was nobody around, and implored him to reveal the secret. The master said, 'Come closer to me,' and the monk moved forward as told. The master said, 'Zen is something that cannot be conveyed by word of mouth.' "

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 30-31):

"While Zen emphatically asserts the all-importance of personal contact, it does not ignore the privilege of conceptualization granted only to the human mind; that is to say, Zen will also resort to verbalism. But what distinguishes Zen conspicuously from other spiritual teachings is its assuming perfect mastery over words or concepts. Instead of becoming a slave to them, it is aware of the role they play in human experience, and assigns them to the place to which they properly belong."

"Man is homo sapiens and also homo faber; but the greatest danger is apt to court in his capacity as homo faber is that he becomes a slave to his own creations. Man makes many tools and uses them effectively in various fields of his activity, but he is always exposing himself to the tyranny of the tools he has made. The result is that he is no more master of himself, but an abject slave to his surroundings, and the worst thing is that he is not conscious of this fact."

"This is specially noticeable in the realm of thought. He has created many valuable concepts by which he has learnt to handle realities. But he now takes concepts for realities, thought for experience, system for life. He forgets that concepts are his own creations, and by no means exhaust reality. Zen is fully conscious of this, and all its mondo are directed towards casting off the false mask of conceptualization. It is for this reason that Zen looks so irrational, and smudges our common-sense picture of the world."

Thus, it is seen that D. T. Suzuki is realistic towards experience and anti-realistic towards concepts. Concepts are regarded as created by human beings and imposed on reality. Truth claims, logic, and languages, being conceptual in nature, are regarded as instruments to be used to handle and navigate about reality. Different human groups have invented different concepts and there is a conventional aspect to concepts as instruments.


9. The Nature of D. T. Suzuki's Second-Order Discourses

A theory is proposed to explain the world or reality. Since reality is complex and many-sided, a theory is usually focused on just some aspects of reality for explanation. A theory that is about some aspects of the world or reality is a first-order theory. According to D. T. Suzuki's first-order theory of knowledge, reality is non-conceptual. Since reality is non-conceptual, there are no genuine truth claims, logical arguments, or spoken and written languages about reality. All these are just conventional instruments one uses to elicit experiences and navigate about reality. They are verbalism for convenience.


But D. T. Suzuki does not just offer us a first-order theory of knowledge about reality, he also talks about and explains his theory. These talks or discourses are his explanations of his first-order theory and they constitute his second-order theory. In these second-order explanations of his first-order theory, D. T. Suzuki is making many truth claims and logical arguments. These truth claims and logical arguments are prohibited by the non-conceptual nature of his first-order theory. When Suzuki uses the predicate "true" or its cognates in either his first- or second-order theories, we must remember that there are no genuine truth claims in Suzuki’s world since for him reality is non-conceptual. In reading the predicate "true", the readers may have the illusion that Suzuki is making truth claims when he is not.


Although his readers might find his explanations of Zen Buddhism illuminating, D. T. Suzuki is very aware that he is doing in his second-order discourses what is prohibited by his first-order epistemology, i.e. using spoken and written languages to make truth claims and logical arguments.

Suzuki ([1953] 1955, 141-142):

"In many cases such mind prefer silence to verbalism or what we may call symbolism to intellectualization. They do not like to risk any form of misunderstanding, for they know that the finger is quite liable to be taken for the moon. The Zen master, generally speaking, despises those who indulge in word- or idea- mongering, and in this respect Hu Shih and myself are great sinners, murderers of Buddhas and patriarchs; we are both destined for hell."


10. A Summary Contrast of Three Positions on Concepts

What is the explanatory relationship between sensation, perception and conception? The following summarily contrast three answers to this question. The positions of Gordon Clark and the logical empiricists may be regarded as the two poles of a continuum and the positions of D. T. Suzuki may instructively be contrasted with them.

The first position is that of Gordon Clark. The chief characteristic of Clark's epistemology in this regard is that sensation and perception is to be explained in terms of conception. Specifically, sensation and perception is to be interpreted and explained by truth, which is conceptual. The motivation for this are the doctrines of the Eternal Decree of God and Creation. God created the world according to His plan and the plan of God for creation is consisted of the truths He has decreed from eternity to be true. God's plan for creation is exhaustive and therefore included our every sensations and perceptions. Thus, our sensations and perceptions are to be explained by the truths God has decreed to be true.

The second position is that of the logical empiricists. Like D. T. Suzuki, the epistemology of the logical empiricists are experience based. Whereas the theory of knowledge of the logical empiricists are limited to sensory experiences and their extension through scientific instruments, Suzuki's is not. This is because most of the logical empiricists are materialists and have background in the sciences and mathematics and are therefore skeptical towards non-sensory experiences. Thus, in common with the Western empirical tradition, the logical empiricists begin their theory of knowledge with sensation. The human mind "somehow" organized the sensation into perception, and the mind "somehow" further abstracted concepts from perception. A perennial problem for the logical empiricists is how to reach logical and mathematical truths from sensation. As a longtime critic of empiricism, Gordon Clark has repeatedly asked the empiricists to explain their theory of perception and abstraction. "Philosophers who insist on giving a role to sensation in the acquisition of knowledge should first define sensation, then show how sensation can become perception, and presumably how memory images can produce universal concepts by abstraction. If this is not their scheme, and it might not be, then they should describe in detail what their scheme is. It is not enough to speak vaguely about some role or other." (Clark 1979, 144). For logical empiricism, concepts are developed from sensation and perception and are to be explained by them. (cf. Rudolph Carnap failed attempt in The Logical Structure of the World ([1928] 2005).)

The third position is that of D. T. Suzuki. The two characteristics of Suzuki's theory of knowledge in this regard are: (a) Suzuki's epistemology embraces both sensory and non-sensory experiences, and (b) Suzuki regards all concepts as conventional or instrumental symbols which the human minds impose on reality. Since truth is conceptual and since the only known bearers of truth and falsity are propositions, this conventional or instrumental view of concepts results in many paradoxes. The paradoxes are signs that there are something wrong with Suzuki's theory. Suzuki may be regarded as a radical empiricist that is realistic towards experiences but anti-realistic towards concepts. In the posthumously published SENGAI The Zen Master, Suzuki wrote: "Zen always wishes to keep itself as close as possible to Reality, so that it will never wander out into the world of concepts or symbols." (Suzuki 1971, 1)


Table 7: Summary of the Three Explanatory Positions



Sensation
Perception
Conception
Gordon Clark

Explanatory direction: (← ) From Conception to Sensation
Logical Empiricism

Explanatory direction: (→ ) From Sensation to Conception
D. T. Suzuki

Explanatory direction: Not applicable


C. The Second Epistemological Strand: The Irrational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's Theory

In Part B, it has been shown that D. T. Suzuki negatively rejects concepts in his epistemology. In Part C, it will be shown that Suzuki positively accepts experiences as his exclusive epistemological objects of knowledge. For this essay, experience is the genus that is consisted of the two species sensory experience and non-sensory experience. Sensory experience include such items as sensations and perceptions: what we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Non-sensory experience include such items as mystical experiences, religious experiences, and emotional experiences.


11. Epistemological versus Ontological Objects of Knowledge

Epistemological objects of knowledge are that which we know in our minds and are mental. Ontological objects of knowledge are that which we know about in the world outside and in ourselves inside. There are two theories as to what are the epistemological objects of knowledge: Experiences and truths. In some theories where experiences are the epistemological objects of knowledge, such as D. T. Suzuki's, experiences are regarded as in direct contact with reality and truths (concepts) as something our minds impose on it. Thus, a realism towards experiences and anti-realism towards truths and concepts. In some theories where truths are the epistemological objects of knowledge, such as Gordon Clark's, truths are regarded as that which interprets reality. There is a realism towards both experiences and truths.

The following Diagram uses the sensory experience of a rose as an example but it is meant to be illustrative of experiences in general.


We will not go into the relationships between the epistemological and ontological objects of knowledge. But different theories need not disagree about the what are the ontological objects of knowledge even if they disagree about what are the epistemological objects of knowledge. Also, different theories that agree about what are the ontological objects of knowledge need not agree as to the nature of those ontological objects. Thus, in D. T. Suzuki's ontology, the ontological objects are things that are interdependently co-arise from emptiness. In Gordon Clark's ontology, the ontological objects of knowledge are of two kinds: God and His creation.

Table 8: Summary of Epistemological versus Ontological Objects of Knowledge



Epistemological Objects of Knowledge Nature of the Ontological Objects
Gordon Clark

Truths (i.e. propositions)

Two kinds: God and His creation
D. T. Suzuki Experiences Interdependently co-arise from emptiness


12. D. T. Suzuki Rejects the Subject-Object Distinction Because of Monistic Pantheism

Like the Indian Buddhism from which it originated, D. T. Suzuki's theory of knowledge abhors dualism and favors monism. Because of monistic pantheism, the Subject-Object Distinction is regarded by Suzuki as something invented by the human minds and not something inherent in reality. Gordon Clark's theory of knowledge, on the other hand, because of the doctrine of Creation, favors the Subject-Object Distinction.

Suzuki ([1949] 1991, 78-79):

"CHIH: 'Do you know that it is because of erroneous discrimination that one conceives of a being, and hence the separation of subject and object. This is known as a confused view. For in accordance with this view one is involved in complexities and falls into the path of birth and death. Those with a clearer insight are not like this one. Seeing may go on all day, and yet there is nothing seen by them. You may seek for traces of seeing in them, but nothing, either of the Body or of the Use, is discoverable here. The duality of subject and object is gone – which is called the seeing into Self-nature.' "

"It is evident that this seeing into self-nature is not an ordinary seeing, in which there is a duality of one who sees and that which is seen. Nor is it a special act of seeing, which, ordinarily understood, takes place at a definite moment and in a definite locality. Nevertheless there is the fact of seeing which cannot be gainsaid. How can such a fact take place in this world of dualities? As long as we cling, to use Buddhist terminology, to this way of thinking, we can never comprehend this Zen experience of seeing into the self-nature. To understand it one must have the experience, and at the same time there must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic – by whatever name it may be known – to give to the experience a rational or an irrational interpretation. The fact comes first, followed by an intellectualization. Chih of Yun-chu has done his best in the above quotation to express his idea of seeing according to the way of thinking which then prevailed. This expression may fail to satisfy our present logical demand, but that has nothing to do with the fact itself."

The purport fact of "seeing into self-nature" is just that, a purported fact. How can Suzuki writes "nevertheless there is the fact of seeing which cannot be gainsaid" when so many of us ordinarily mortals do not have this experience of seeing into self-nature and do indeed gainsay it? It is a special pleading when Suzuki writes "to understand it one must have the experience, and at the same time there must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic".

The Four Sacred Verses of Bodhidharma (Chinese: 達摩四聖句) (translated by Piya Tan):

A special [separate] transmission outside the teachings (教外別傳),
do not depend on written words (不立文字),
directly point to the human mind (直指人心),
see one's nature and become Buddha (見性成佛).

When D. T. Suzuki writes on "satori" (Chinese: ) and "seeing into self-nature" (Chinese: 見性), he is writing on some of the most central ideas of Chan and Zen Buddhism. They function similarly to Nicene theology or Chalcedonian christology in orthodox Christianity.


13. The Satori Experience as a Perfect Being Theory of Knowledge

Those who have read some Christian theology may be aware of "perfect being theology". While biblical and systematic theology are based on exegesis of the Bible, "perfect being theology" is philosophically motivated. "One prominent methodological strand of philosophical theology is perfect being theology, in which the nature of God is made more explicit by identifying God as an absolutely perfect being and working out what features an absolutely perfect being must exhibit". (Murphy 2014)

The theory of knowledge that lies behind the Satori experience, which is so central to D. T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, may be construed as an experience based epistemology where the knower is omniscient – a perfect being theory. The theory is also underlies by monistic pantheism. The followings are continuous quotation from pages 46 to 49 of Suzuki's Living by Zen ([1950] 1991) with headlines added.

(a) The Satori Experience is Essential to Understanding Zen

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 46):

"To understand Zen, it is essential to have an experience known as Satori, for without this one can have no insight into the truth of Zen, which, as we have already seen, is generally paradoxically expressed:"

"When snow covers all the mountains white, why is one left uncovered (literally, not white)?"

"The ascetic, pure in heart, does not enter Nirvana (i.e. Paradise); the monk violating the Precepts does not fall into Hell."

"What I know, you do not know; what you know, I know all."

"While the post is moving around all day, how is it that I do not know?"

"How is it that a man of great strength cannot lift his legs?"

(b) Satori Makes Intelligible Statements Defy Being Fitted into the Frame of Logical Reasonableness

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 46):

"All these statements defy being fitted into the frame of logical reasonableness. To make them intelligible satori is needed. They are in fact purposely set forth by Zen masters to confuse those minds whose field of operation cannot go beyond our everyday common-sense experience. When satori is attained the irrationalities cease to be such; they fall back on the level of logic and commonsense. The hunter is said not to know the mountain because he is right in them. He has to be up in the air to see the whole range of the undulations."

(c) Monistic Pantheism Underlies the Satori Experience

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 46-47):

"Satori achieves this feat; it detaches a man from his environment, and makes him survey the entire field. But this does not mean that satori keeps him away from the field where it operates. This is a dualistic way of interpreting satori, for a genuine satori is at once transcendent and imminent. It becomes really operative at the point where subject is object and object is subject. Or we can say that unless this identity is effected there is no satori. In satori what is imminent is transcendent and what is transcendent is imminent. The hunter is at once out of the mountains and in them, for he has never gone one step away from them."

(d) Satori is a Concrete Experience and not an Abstract Conception

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 47):

"We must remember, however, that satori is not a mere intellectual discipline; nor is it a kind of dialectic whereby contradictoriness becomes logically tenable and turns into a reasonable proposition. Satori is existential and not dialectical, as Kierkegaard may say. It does not work with logical formulas and abstractions. It is a concrete fact in itself. When it states that the waters do not flow but the bridge does, it is, to men of satori, not a paradox but a direct statement of their living existential experience. Kierkegaard says that faith is an existential leap. So is satori. Faith has a Christian ring, while satori is specifically Zen. In my view both are experientially identifiable."

(e) Field of Experience as Continuum and Postulation

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 47):

"What is given us primarily, immediately, is a continuum which is not divisible into atoms; but as we ‘experience’ it, it divides itself into an infinity of atoms. This is due to our sense limitations and to the construction of consciousness. We do not ordinarily reflect on this fact and go on with our daily life, taking sensual-intellectual facts of experience for finalities. Those who reflect, however, build up a world of concepts, and postulate a continuum. But as this is the result of intellectual deliberation the continuum is not apprehended as such by most of us."

(f) Satori as Omniscient: An All-Embracing Whole Must be Directly Grasped as a Whole Complete in Itself. The Continuum is both Infinitely Cumulative and Infinitely Divided

Suzuki ([1950] 1991, 47-49):

"To us, therefore, God is not an object of immediate experience. He is inferred by logical process. He is thought of, he is not seen. From thinking to seeing is not a continuous process, it is a leap. For however much we multiply our atomic experiences of parts, no continuum as a concrete whole will be experienced. The concrete whole is to be intuited as such. The whole is not to be apprehended by accumulations; a whole thus arrived at is no more than parts added, and however far we may carry this addition it goes on ad infinitum. An all-embracing whole must be directly grasped as a whole complete in itself. But if it is grasped in the way in which parts, atomic parts, are grasped, it ceases to be a whole, it turns to be a part of the whole which, as an infinitely expansible totality, for ever eludes our prehension, which is postulationally conditioned."

"Therefore, the continuum, undivided, indivisible, infinitely cumulative, and yet a concrete object of apprehension, cannot belong to the world of particulars. It belongs to another order of existence; it constitutes a world by itself, and it is attainable only by transcending our everyday experience of sense- intellect, that is, by an existential leap. This is satori."

"It is thus seen that satori is the apprehending of the continuum as such, as not subject to differentiation and determination. But the continuum thus apprehended as the object, as it were, of satori experience ought not to be judged as standing against particular objects of our daily experience. When this way of thinking is cherished, satori is no more satori; it turns to be one of sense-experiences, and creates a new continuum over the one we already have, and we shall have to repeat this process indefinitely."

"Another important thing to remember is that satori takes in the continuum not only as undifferentiated and undeterminated but as infinitely divided and determinated. This means that satori is never in conflict with the world of sense-intellect, it never negates its experiences. When it declares that the spade is in my hands and yet I am empty-handed, it does not mean to contradict the fact of the spade's actually being in the hands, but it only means that each single fact of experience is to be relate to the totality of things, for thereby it gains for the first time its meaning."


14. A Criticism of D. T. Suzuki's Theory of Satori Experience

How does one criticize the satori experience of D. T. Suzuki effectively? A common distinction in criticism is between internal versus external criticism. Internal criticism is criticism from a standpoint within a theory and external criticism is criticism from a standpoint outside the theory. It is generally agreed that internal criticism is more effective than external criticism. For example, a protestant sharing certain common assumptions with a catholic may be more effective in his criticism of that catholic using their shared assumptions than a Buddhist criticizing a catholic using Buddhist assumptions.

Principal among internal criticism is criticizing the logical coherence of a theory. The basis of logical criticism is that it is irrational or absurd to accept two truth claims that are inconsistent with each other. The law of non-contradiction applies and irrationalities or absurdities are bad and to be avoided. If it is shown that two assumptions of a theory or their implications cannot both be true, then a theory has been effectively criticized. The theory has to be revised in some ways or be abandoned. But logical criticism of the satori experience is not effective since it is avowedly non-conceptual. In fact, in Suzuki's Zen Buddhism, the satori experience is fundamental and theories are invented after the experience to justify the experience. "To understand it one must have the experience, and at the same time there must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic – by whatever name it may be known – to give to the experience a rational or an irrational interpretation. The fact comes first, followed by an intellectualization." (Suzuki [1949] 1991, 79)

Another internal criticism is challenging the explanatory adequacy of the theory for the data. This line of criticism is also ineffective against the satori experience for the same reason above. The satori experience comes first and any theory that interprets or explains the experience is invented after to rationalize the experience, whether the theory be rational or irrational.

If there are no effective rational criticisms against the satori experience itself, maybe the best we can do is to criticize the theories that purport to rationally explain the satori experience. In so far as the explanatory theory is meant as a rational theory, it is subject to the canon of rational criticism. If all the extent rational theories of the satori experience is effectively criticized and only irrational theories are left, maybe the satori experience is irrational after all and not just a-rational.

There are many rational criticisms of D. T. Suzuki's theory of the satori experience but I have the space to pursue only one of them. The criticism is that if his theory is true, then the satori experience is not realizable by human beings. Recall that having the satori experience means "an all-embracing whole must be directly grasped as a whole complete in itself" (Suzuki [1950] 1991, 48) The all-embracing whole maybe either infinite or finite. If the all-embracing whole is infinite, then the satori experience as theorized by Suzuki requires a human person to "be" an omniscient being and no finite human beings can be omniscient. Notice that Suzuki's theory does not mean that a person having some conceptions of infinity is sufficient for the satori experience. Anyone with an introductory course in calculus will have some conceptions of the infinitely small and anyone with an introductory course in set theory will have some conceptions of the infinitely large. But it takes a perfect being to directly grasped, in one experience, an infinite, all-embracing whole as a whole in itself and human beings are not perfect beings.

What if the "all-embracing whole" is finite like our physical universe? In this case, our universe is larger than human beings by such an extent that it is not possible for us to grasp our physical universe "as a whole complete in itself". Again, Suzuki's theory is not realizable by any human beings. As our knowledge of the physical universe increases, what constitutes a finite "all-embracing whole" becomes larger and larger and there is a drive towards omniscient to realize the satori experience. If Suzuki's theory is not realizable by any human beings, then according to his theory no human beings can have the satori experience.


D. The Hu Shih – D. T. Suzuki Exchange of 1953

15. Introducing the 1953 Exchange

Hu Shih (1891-1962) (family name: Hu) was a Chinese scholar equal in stature with D. T. Suzuki. Hu received his doctorate in philosophy under John Dewey at Columbia University in New York in the 1910s. Among his many interests, Hu had done original textual studies on the manuscripts of the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch newly discovered at Dunhuang in the early 20th Century. Like his teacher Dewey, Hu was a pragmatist.

In 1953, D. T. Suzuki had an exchange with Hu Shih in the April issue of the journal Philosophy East and West. The exchange was initiated by Hu's criticism and ended with Suzuki's response. See: (Hu 1953) and (Suzuki 1953). Citations are from the reprints (Hu [1953] 2013) and (Suzuki [1953] 1955). There are three subsequent responses to the 1953 Hu Shih-D. T. Suzuki Exchange in Philosophy East and West alone: (a) Van Meter Ames's "Zen and Pragmatism" (1954), (b) Arthur Waley's "History and Religion" (1955), and (c) James D. Sellmann's "A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki" (1995).


16. Is Zen Buddhism Irrational?

The initial position of the Exchange is set by Hu Shih ([1953] 2013, 235-236):

"As a friend and as a historian of Chinese thought, I have followed Suzuki's work with keen interest. But I have never concealed from him my disappointment in his method of approach. My greatest disappointment has been that, according to Suzuki and his disciples, Zen is illogical, irrational, and, therefore, beyond our intellectual understanding. In his book Living by Zen Suzuki tells us:"

"If we are to judge Zen from our common-sense view of things, we shall find the ground sinking away under our feet. Our so-called rationalistic way of thinking has apparently no use in evaluating the truth or untruth of Zen. It is altogether beyond the ken of human understanding. All that we can therefore state about Zen is that its uniqueness lies in its irrationality or its passing beyond our logical comprehension."

"It is this denial of the capability of the human intelligence to understand and evaluate Zen that I emphatically refuse to accept. Is the so-called Ch'an or Zen really so illogical and irrational that it is 'altogether beyond the ken of human understanding' and that our rational or rationalistic way of thinking is of no use 'in evaluating the truth and untruth of Zen'?"

As a historian, Hu Shih proceeds to defend the rationality of Chinese Chan by expositing on the history of Chan Buddhism, especially its pedagogical method, which on the surface seems illogical.

D. T. Suzuki begins his response ([1953] 1955, 135):

"One of my first impressions after reading Dr. Hu Shih's learned and instructive paper on Zen Buddhism in China is that he may know a great deal about history but nothing about the actor behind it. History is a kind of public property accessible to everybody who is at liberty to handle it according to his judgment. To this extent history is something objective, and its materials or facts, though these are quite an indefinite element in the make-up of history, are like scientific objects ready to be examined by the students. They are not, of course, subject to planned experiments. On the other hand, the actor or creator, the man who is behind history, eludes the historian's objective handling. What constitutes his individuality or subjectivity cannot be made the object of historical investigation, because it refuses to manifest itself objectively. It can be appreciated only by himself. His is a unique existence which can never be duplicated, and this uniqueness in its metaphysical sense, or in its deepest sense, can be intuited only by the man himself. It is not the historian's business to peer into it. In fact, however much he may try, he will always be frustrated in his attempt. Hu Shih fails to understand this."

Suzuki ([1953] 1955, 136-137):

"My contention is twofold: (1) Zen is not explainable by mere intellectual analysis. As long as the intellect is concerned with words and ideas, it can never reach Zen. (2) Even when Zen is treated historically, Hu Shih's way of setting it in a historical frame is not correct, because he fails to understand what Zen is. I must strongly insist that Zen must first be comprehended as it is in itself; only then can one proceed to the study of its historical objectifications, as Hu Shih does."

What is interesting about D. T. Suzuki's entire reply to Hu Shih is that Suzuki never attempted to rebut Hu by saying that Hu has misunderstood him when quoting "all that we can therefore state about Zen is that its uniqueness lies in its irrationality or its passing beyond our logical comprehension." Yet Suzuki seems to be very upset when Hu quoted Suzuki's own words against him about the irrationality of Zen and with Hu's attempts to show the rationality of Chinese Chan through historical analysis.

My reading of the 1953 Exchange is that both Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki have misunderstood Suzuki's Zen Buddhism. Suzuki has incorrectly characterized his own position as irrational when it is in fact a-rational. If reality is non-conceptual and therefore a-rational, and if verbal talks are not meant to make genuine truth claims about reality but are verbalism for convenience, then the verbal talks about reality can be either rational or irrational. Why is Suzuki upset with Hu when by Suzuki's own position Hu has done what is perfectly permissible? Suzuki is upset because he has misunderstood his own position as irrational.

My reading of the a-rationality of D. T. Suzuki's Zen Buddhism is corroborated by James D. Sellmann (1995, 99): "Both Hu and Suzuki have misrepresented 'Zen,' for it is neither logical nor illogical, but alogical."


E. A Clarkian Explanation of the A-Rationality and Irrationality of the Epistemology of D. T. Suzuki

Part E will outline a Clarkian Theory of Knowledge and will briefly shows that it is immune from the criticisms level against D. T. Suzuki's. The theses of the theory are not all personal views of Gordon Clark but involve some conservative extensions of his positions. Following that is a recapitulation of what is epistemologically wrong with the intuition lying behind Suzuki's theory of knowledge.

17. Twenty-Four Theses of a Clarkian Theory of Knowledge

What are the Epistemological Objects of Knowledge?

Thesis 1 : The epistemological objects of knowledge are truths.
Thesis 2 : The only known bearers of truth and falsity are propositions.
Thesis 3 : The epistemological objects of knowledge are propositions.
Thesis 4 : Percepts are neither true nor false and therefore are not epistemological objects of knowledge.

Are truths relative to conceptual schemes and perspectives?

Thesis 5 : Propositions are the bearers of both truth and meaning.
Thesis 6 : Truths are invariant with respect to the conceptual schemes and perspectives in which they are expressed.
Thesis 7 : A proposition is individuated by its meaning.
Thesis 8 : The meaning of a proposition is dependent on the conceptual schemes and perspectives in which it is expressed.
Thesis 9 : A change in meaning implies that a different proposition is being individuated.
Thesis 10 : Percepts are bearers of meanings but not of truth and falsity.
Thesis 11 : The meanings of percepts are the propositions use to interpret the percepts.
Thesis 12 : An interpretation of a percept is true if the meaning of the interpreting proposition is part of the meanings of the corresponding percept.

What is the nature of truth?

Thesis 13 : Truths or propositions exist eternally and necessarily as the objects of God's conceptual thoughts.
Thesis 14 : Necessary truths are truths that refer to God-in-Himself.
Thesis 15 : Necessary truths do not depend on the Will of God but on the nature of His being.
Thesis 16 : Contingent truths are truths that refer to God and His creation.
Thesis 17 : Contingent truths depend on the Will of God as to what He decrees to create.
Thesis 18 : The necessity of God's mind lies in that all propositions exist eternally and necessarily as objects of God's conceptual thoughts. (i.e. A necessary proposition is necessarily necessary; a contingent proposition is necessarily contingent.)
Thesis 19 : The freedom of God's mind lies in that which among all the maximally consistent sets of propositions He will bring about as the actual world is determined by His will.

What is the relationship between truths and creation?

Thesis 20 : God creates the world according to His plan.
Thesis 21 : God's plan for creation is His Eternal Decree which is consisted of the contingently true propositions He has determined to be true.
Thesis 22 : In creating, God brings about contingent actual states of affairs from the contingently true propositions He has determined to be true.
Thesis 23 : Contingent truths are grounded in the Eternal Decree of God and their truth-markers are the actual states of affairs of Creation.
Thesis 24 : Truth interprets creation because creation is brought about from truth.


18. Some Implications of a Clarkian Theory for How Human Persons Know

Human beings are the image of God and bear that image in knowledge and morality.

Human persons know by knowing some of the truths that God knows. God, being omniscient, knows all truth. If God knows all truths and if we do not know some of the truths that God knows, then we do not know at all. When we know, we therefore think the identical propositions in God's mind. Human beings, being finite image of God, only know some truths. Although our knowledge is partial, it is true. How do we know some of the truths that God knows? By reading the Holy Bible. The Bible is the Word of God and it has many literary forms among which are propositional truth claims. When rightly understood, these truth claims and their logical consequences are true. Thus, humans can know some of the truths God knows by reading the Bible.

While truths are God's conceptual thoughts, logic is the way God thinks, and communication is possible because we can all think some of the truths in God's mind. Our spoken and written languages are structures the human minds uses to "tag" the thoughts in God's mind. Thus, Gordon Clark's theory of knowledge is immune from the criticisms level against D. T. Suzuki's.


 Diagram D : A Clarkian Epistemological Model


19. A Fundamental Disagreement with D. T. Suzuki's Theory of Knowledge

Aside from D. T. Suzuki rejecting the Subject-Object Distinction, a fundamental disagreement between Gordon Clark and Suzuki is about what are the epistemological objects of knowledge. According to Clark, we know truths or propositions; according to Suzuki it is experiences. But unlike the logical empiricists who tried to reach truths from experiences, Suzuki gives up on truths or concepts altogether. To Suzuki, concepts are instruments to elicit experiences. Despite of himself, Suzuki is not altogether wrong because experiences are meaningful. We can make truth claims, reason logically, and talk rationally about our experiences because all our experiences are brought about from the truths God has determined to be true. Created reality are inherently meaningful because it is brought about from truths. Truth interprets creation because creation is brought about from truth. As the Bible says: "By faith we understand that the universe was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made from things that are not visible." (Hebrews 11:3 CSB)

In reading the many writings of D. T. Suzuki, I find him to be a very intelligent person. One virtue of Suzuki is that he tries to explain Zen Buddhism in a rational manner. One vice is that his explanatory theories of Zen contain many paradoxes and are not logically consistent. A reason for the paradoxes in his writings is because they proceed from false assumptions. A fundamental false assumption in Suzuki's theory is the claim that the epistemological objects of knowledge are non-conceptual experiences when what we know are conceptual truths. Since Suzuki purports to know non-conceptual experiences, a consequence is that his theory when properly understood is a-rational and indifferent between the rational and the irrational.

When Suzuki writes ([1953] 1955, 153):

"Mathematics has this: 0=0, 1=1, 1+1=2, and so on. Zen has these too, but it has no objection to the following either: 0=1, 0=2, 1 +1=3, etc. Why? Because zero is infinity and infinity is zero. Is this not irrational and beyond our comprehension?"

I find his theory of knowledge to be untenable.


F. Conclusion

This essay is in essentials an extension and application of Gordon Clark's criticisms of empiricism to the Zen Buddhism of D. T. Suzuki. I have partially discharged the intellectual debt I owe to Clark by explaining why I find the Zen Buddhism of Suzuki untenable. There are many disagreements between Christian Theism and Pantheism, and between Reformed Protestantism and Zen Buddhism. This essay has only scratch the surface of the disagreements by following two strands in the epistemological disagreements between Gordon H. Clark and D. T. Suzuki.


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End.