Note: This
Essay was drafted in 2017. A pdf version of this Essay is available:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1XZznoQ5TFOnKXlbvwcFc38NRjzGkoTQK?usp=sharing
Contents
A.
Introductory Remarks
1.
Introduction
2.
Locating Gordon Clark within Christianity
3.
Locating D. T. Suzuki within Buddhism
4.
The Religious
Context of Gordon
Clark and D. T. Suzuki's
Epistemologies
B.
The First Epistemological Strand:
The A-Rational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's
Theory
5.
The Rejection of Concepts
by D. T. Suzuki
6.
The First Non-Conceptual Paradox: Truth
7.
The Second Non-Conceptual Paradox: Logic
8.
The Third Non-Conceptual Paradox: Language
9.
The Nature of D. T. Suzuki's Second-Order Discourses
10.
A Summary Contrast of Three Positions on Concepts
C.
The Second Epistemological Strand: The Irrational Aspect of D. T.
Suzuki's Theory
11.
Epistemological versus Ontological Objects of Knowledge
12.
D. T. Suzuki Rejects the Subject-Object Distinction Because of
Monistic Pantheism
13.
The Satori Experience as a Perfect Being Theory of Knowledge
14.
A Criticism of D.
T. Suzuki's
Theory of Satori Experience
D.
The Hu Shih – D. T. Suzuki
Exchange of 1953
15.
Introducing the 1953 Exchange
16.
Is Zen Buddhism Irrational?
E.
A Clarkian
Explanation of the A-Rationality and Irrationality of the
Epistemology of D. T. Suzuki
17.
Twenty-Four Theses of a
Clarkian Theory of Knowledge
18.
Some Implications of a
Clarkian Theory for How Human
Persons Know
19.
A Fundamental Disagreement with D. T. Suzuki's
Theory of Knowledge
F.
Conclusion
References
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clark
and Zen: On the Untenability of D. T. Suzuki’s Theory of Knowledge
Benjamin
Wong
"You
will know the truth, and the truth will set you free."
(John 8:32)
A.
Introductory Remarks
1.
Introduction
This
essay is a partial discharge of the intellectual debt I owe to Gordon
H. Clark (1902-1985). In my youth, after I became a Christian, I have
thought about Chan Buddhism. But later, through reading the writings
of Clark, I became convinced that Chan Buddhism is untenable. The
following is my explanation why.
For
specificity, D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966) is selected for exposition,
contrast, and criticism. This is for three reasons. First, Suzuki is
instrumental in spreading Zen Buddhism to the West. Second, Suzuki
has written many books and essays in English, which lessen the danger
of misinterpretation when quoting him. And third, like Gordon Clark,
Suzuki is not only a scholar but a practitioner of his religion.
Evidencing this third point, the longtime editor of many of Suzuki's
books, Christmas Humphreys (1901-1983), has written: "Dr
Suzuki writes with authority. Not only has he studied original works
in Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese and Japanese, but he has an up-to-date
knowledge of Western thought in German and French as well as the
English which he speaks and writes so fluently. He is, moreover, more
than a scholar; he is a Buddhist. Though not a priest of any Buddhist
sect, he is honoured in every temple in Japan, for his knowledge of
spiritual things, as all who have sat at his feet bear witness, is
direct and profound. When he speaks of the higher stages of
consciousness he speaks as a man who dwells therein, and the
impression he makes on those who enter the fringes of his mind is
that of a man who seeks for the intellectual symbols wherewith to
describe a state of awareness which lies indeed 'beyond
the intellect'. " (Suzuki
[1949] 2000, 11)
Both
Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki are profound thinkers. This essay can
only focus on one aspect of their works: epistemology or the theory
of knowledge. The method employed is that of the presuppositionalism
of Gordon Clark – the truth of the Holy Bible and of Clark's
theology and philosophy will be assumed and with them the Zen
Buddhism of D. T. Suzuki will be critically engaged. For this essay,
the question of how representative Suzuki is of either Japanese Zen
or Chinese Chan will not be considered. The analysis of Suzuki will
consist of two related epistemological strands. The first strand is
concerned with concepts (objects of conception) and consists of three
points: (a) Suzuki rejects concepts. (b) Since truth, logic, and
language are conceptual, the rejection of concepts leads to paradoxes
in these areas. (c) Since rationality requires conceptual judgment
using truth claims, logic, and language, the rejection of concepts
leads to what appears to be irrationality but is in fact
a-rationality. The second strand is concerned with percepts (objects
of perception), or more generally, experiences as the epistemological
objects of knowledge. In Suzuki's Zen
Buddhism, the satori (enlightenment or sudden awakening) experience
maybe construed as an experience based perfect being theory. There is
a drive towards omniscience even when satori is considered as an
experience of finite beings. These two strands render Suzuki's
epistemology both false and untenable. In contrasts with Suzuki,
Gordon Clark's epistemology, for reasons to be
briefly explained later, is immune from these criticisms.
Before
we move on to epistemology, the next
two sections will
provide some
historical backgrounds
on Gordon
Clark and D. T. Suzuki. The
backgrounds are meant to caution the readers about two things: (a)
The limited scope of this essay. This essay does
not seek to
refute Zen Buddhism from a conservative
Christian viewpoint
but only to explain
why the epistemology of D. T. Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism is untenable. (b) Although he
stands in the Japanese Zen tradition, D. T.
Suzuki may not be taken as representative
of all Chinese Chan or Japanese Zen. Readers
are cautioned not
to assume that everything
of Chan or Zen
Buddhism will
automatically apply
to Suzuki, and
vice versa. Buddhism and its Zen varieties
have a history no
less complex than Christianity. As one cannot
assume that since both Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin are Christians
therefore their theologies
are the same, so also one cannot
assume that since Japanese Zen originated
from Chinese Chan therefore they
are the same. And
so it is also
between D. T.
Suzuki's
version of Zen Buddhism and the other varieties of
Chan and Zen.
2.
Locating Gordon Clark within Christianity
Christianity
is historically divided into two branches: Roman Catholicism and
Eastern Orthodoxy. The Protestantism churches were separated from
Roman Catholicism during the Reformation. The formal principle of the
Reformation is sola scriptura –
the Bible is the only infallible rule for faith and practice. The
material principle of the Reformation is sola fide
– justification is by faith alone and excludes all works. There are
four major branches of Protestantism: Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican,
and Anabaptist. Gordon Clark is a protestant philosopher and
theologian in the Reformed or
Calvinistic tradition.
The
chief characteristic of Gordon Clark's
philosophy is that it is an extension of his theology. The chief
characteristic of Clark's
theology is that it regards the Bible is the Word of God and
therefore inerrant in the autographs. Since the Bible is the Word of
God, what God claims in the Bible as true is true. The methodology of
Clark's
theology and philosophy is to start with the truth claims of the
Bible as true and to use logic to deduce what one can from the Bible.
Since deductive logic is truth-preserving, one arrives at truths from
truths. The chief concept in Clark's
philosophy and epistemology is therefore truth.
There
are certain characteristics of truths
that are prominent in Clark's
philosophy:
(a)
Truths are propositional.
(b)
Truths are coherent and do not contradict each other.
(c)
Some truths imply other truths and therefore truths form a system of
interrelated propositions.
Gordon
Clark's
philosophy is an extension of his Biblical
theology. Although
a philosopher by profession, Gordon Clark is a theologian and Bible
scholar at heart. An inspection of Clark's
bibliography reveals that he has not only written books in
philosophy, but also books on theology and commentaries on the Bible.
The
theological system that Gordon Clark regards as most faithful to the
Bible is Reformed theology or
Calvinism. In Clark's
view, the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), a Reformed
confession, is the most accurate summary of the truth claims of the
Bible. Clark has written two
commentaries
on the Westminster Confession of Faith (cf. Clark 1956
and 1965). Since truths do
not contradict each other and since some truths imply others, in
developing his philosophy Clark uses the Bible and Reformed theology
as both premises and control. As premises, the Bible is use to
deduce philosophical claims. As control, any philosophical claims
that is inconsistent with
the Bible is regarded
as false. Reformed theology
functions similarly
to the Bible in forming philosophical claims but as a subordinate
standard to the Bible. Since the Bible functions as premises in
Clark's
philosophy, it is also known as Scripturalism.
3.
Locating D. T. Suzuki within Buddhism
Like
Christianity, there are different "branches"
and "schools"
within Buddhism. The two major branches of Indian Buddhism are
Theravada and Mahayana. Theravada seeks the enlightenment of
individual sentient beings while Mahayana seeks the enlightenment of
all sentient beings. Chan Buddhism is a Chinese indigenous version of
Mahayana Buddhism with special developments
in "meditation".
The Sanskrit "Dhyana"
means "meditation"
and is transliterated into
Chinese as 'Chan'
and Japanese as 'Zen'.
The
first patriarch of Chinese Chan is the Indian monk Bodhidharma.
According to legends, Bodhidharma
traveled by sea
and reached present day Guangzhou in China
in the early sixth
century and
achieved enlightenment after nine years of meditation at
a cave near Shaolin Monastery on Mount
Song. Chan Buddhism valued lineage and
orthodox transmission
was symbolized by the passing on of the "robe
and bowl of dharma"
from generation to generation.
Table
1: The
First Six
Patriarchs of
Chan Buddhism
| Patriarch | Chinese | Principal Text |
| (1) Bodhidharma (c.440–c.528) | 菩提達摩 | Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經) |
| (2) Huike (487-593) | 慧可 | " " |
| (3) Sengcan (d.606) | 僧燦 | " " |
| (4) Daoxin (580-651) | 道信 | " " |
| (5) Hongren (601-674) | 弘忍 | " " |
| (6) Huineng (638-713) | 惠能 | Diamond Sutra (金剛經) |
There
was a division of Chan Buddhism into two schools
after the fifth patriarch:
The Northern School
and the Southern
School. The
official Chan lineage
was transmitted through the
Southern School.
In Chinese Buddhism, only a record of (or a
commentary
on) the teachings of the
Buddha can be called a
"sutra (經)".
The Platform Sutra of the Sixth
Patriarch (六祖壇經)
is the only Chinese composed text that is honored by being titled as
a "sutra".
Table
2:
The Two Schools
of Chan Buddhism
| School | Founder | Student of | Distinctive |
| Northern Chan | Shenxiu (神秀) (c.606-706) | Hongren (601-674) | Gradual enlightenment over time |
| Southern Chan | Huineng (惠能) (638-713) | Hongren (601-674) | Sudden enlightenment at a point in time |
Meditation
belongs to all schools of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana. Chan
became a distinct tradition
of Chinese Buddhism through the efforts of
the six
Patriarchs and the Northern and Southern Schools. The
Sixth Patriarch Huineng (638-713) discontinued
the practice of passing on the "robe
and bowl of dharma"
as a symbol of orthodox transmission and
Chan Buddhism thereafter
was divided into
many "denominations".
Huineng has many
notable students of
which I will mention three and many
later Chan schools traced their lineage to only
the first two of
them. Important in history of
the later Chan schools are the "Five
Houses and Seven Schools".
The importance of Shenhui (684-758)
lies in that through political intrigue, he
established his teacher Huineng as the Sixth
Patriarch and the Southern School as
orthodox.
Table
3: Three Students of the Sixth Patriarch Huineng (638-713)
| Students of Huineng (638-713) | Chinese |
| Xingsi of Qingyuan (660-740) | 青原行思 |
| Huairang of Nanyue (677-744) | 南嶽懐譲 |
| Shenhui of Heze (684-758) | 菏澤神會 |
Table
4:
Five Houses of Chan Buddhism that
Originated in Tang Dynasty (618-907)
| House | Founder(s) | Lineage |
| Guiyang School (溈仰宗) | Lingyou of Guishan (溈山靈祐) (771-854) | 3rd generation descendant of Huairang |
| Huiji of Yangshan (仰山慧寂) (807-883) | Student of Lingyou | |
| Linji School (臨濟宗) | Yixuan of Linji (臨濟義玄) (d.866) | 4th generation descendant of Huairang |
| Caodong School (曹洞宗) | Liangjie of Dongshan (洞山良價) (807-869) | 4th generation descendant of Xingsi |
| Benji of Caoshan (曹山本寂) (840-901) | Student of Liangjie | |
| Yunmen School (雲門宗) | Wenyan of Yunmen (雲門文偃) (864-949) | 6th generation descendant Xingsi |
| Fayan School (法眼宗) | Fayan Wenyi (法眼文益) (885-958) | 8th generation descendant of Xingsi |
Table
5:
Two Schools that Originated in
Song Dynasty (960-1279) that are
Branches
of Linji
School
| School | Founder | Lineage |
| Yangqi School (楊岐派) | Fanghui of Yangqi (楊岐方會) (992-c.1049) | 7th generation descendant of Yixuan of Linji |
| Huanglong School (黃龍派) | Huinan of Huanglong (黃龍慧南) (1002-1069) | 7th generation descendant of Yixuan of Linji |
Although
there were many cultural exchanges between China and Japan during the
Tang dynasty (618-907) and Chan Buddhism was
among them, Japanese Zen did not become
established until the Kamakura period (1185-1333) of the Kamakura
shogunate, the first of three shogunates
in Japan. There were no major developments
in Japanese Buddhism between the Kamakura period and the time of D.
T. Suzuki. According to Suzuki, "After
the Kamakura period, down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate
(1867), which meant roughly six hundred years of peace and uneventful
life for Buddhism, there was nothing that could stimulate the growth
of new life in it except that the new schools of the Kamakura period
continued to flourish."
(Suzuki 1958, 103)
There
are presently three major Zen sects in Japan: Soto
school, Rinzai school, and Obaku
school. Soto
is the Japanese line of Caodong, Rinzai is
the line of Linji (mainly through the
Yangqi school), and Obaku
is the line of a
later variant of Linji. ('Soto'
and 'Caodong'
transliterated
the Chinese
characters '曹洞';
'Rinzai’ and
'Linji'
transliterated the characters '臨濟'.)
Although
never become a
Buddhist monk, D. T. Suzuki received his
Zen training in
the Rinzai temple Engaku-ji
in the city of Kamakura under
master Shaku Soen.
"Having trained
intensively in Rinzai Zen with a series of teachers from the 1880s
until the death of his primary teacher, Shaku Sōen (1860–1919),
Suzuki wrote about the world through the lens of Rinzai Zen, which,
despite its problems in the twentieth century, remained for Suzuki
the reservoir of true Buddhist understanding and insight."
(Jaffe 2014, xii) The
hitting and other uses of force refer to in
some later quotations of Suzuki's
are distinctive of Linji Chan or Rinzai
Zen and those influenced by them.
4.
The Religious
Context of Gordon
Clark and D. T. Suzuki's
Epistemologies
The
focus of this essay is on
the
epistemology or
theory of
knowledge of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki. Although meant to be
general, their epistemologies
are developed within the context of their religions. The following
Table summarizes the religious problems against which their
respective epistemology
is developed.
Table
6: The Basic Religious Problems of Gordon Clark and D. T. Suzuki
| Gordon Clark | D. T. Suzuki | |
| Worldview | Christian Theism | Pantheism |
| Religion | Reformed Protestantism | Zen Buddhism |
| Problem | Sin against God | Sufferings |
| Nature of the Problem | Moral | Moral |
| Solution | Atonement by Jesus Christ | Enlightenment |
| Nature of the Solution | Moral | Epistemological |
| Method | Justification by Faith alone | Satori Experience |
Christian
Theism is the worldview that the personal God of the Holy
Bible exists and that He has
created the world. Pantheism is the
worldview that the world is God. Christmas
Humphreys recorded a conversation he had with D. T. Suzuki: "He
taught me in one remark what Zen is not, and gave a hint of what it
is. We were discussing Buddhism as pantheism. 'I
see what you mean,'
I said, 'all is God
but there is no God.'
'No,'
he said, after the usual moment's
thought. 'It would
be better to say, "All
is God and there is no God."
' "
(Humphreys 2000, xii) The second conjunct, "there
is no God", of
course, is to deny the existence of the Christian God.
Both
"faith"
and "satori
experience"
are essentially epistemological although the epistemologies involved
are very different. Where the object of
knowledge in Gordon Clark's
epistemology is truth or proposition, in D. T. Suzuki's
epistemology it is experience.
B.
The First Epistemological Strand:
The A-Rational Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's
Theory
5.
The Rejection of Concepts
by D. T. Suzuki
The
chief characteristic of D. T. Suzuki's
epistemology is its rejection of concepts.
There are three
basic epistemological powers of the human mind: sensation,
perception, and conception. Sensation is
the detection of internal or external stimulation. Perception
is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensation
in order to represent and understand the
sensory information.
Conception is the formation of beliefs
about ourselves and the world. Conception
may be about our
sensations and
perceptions, but
is not limited to them as such.
The rejection of concepts makes Suzuki's
theory of knowledge a-rational.
6.
The First Non-Conceptual Paradox: Truth
Since
truth is
conceptual
and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts
in his epistemology, Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot make any genuine truth claims
and cannot appraise any propositions as either true or false. What
appears to be truth claims are considered by Suzuki to be verbalism
for
convenience.
(Suzuki
[1950] 1991, 20):
"If
we are to judge Zen from our common-sense view of things, we shall
find the ground sinking away from under our feet. Our so-called
rationalistic way of thinking has apparently no use in evaluating the
truth or untruth of Zen. All that we can therefore state about Zen is
that its
uniqueness lies in its irrationality or its passing beyond our
logical comprehension. It is true that religion has generally
something that is not to be grasped by mere logic, and appeals to a
revelation or acceptance by faith. For instance, the existence of
God, who has created the world out of nothing, is not logically
provable or experientially demonstrable, and is to be accepted by
faith. But Zen's
irrationality does not seem to be of the same order as the religious
irrationality, so called."
It
is infelicitous when Suzuki wrote that the uniqueness of Zen "lies
in its irrationality".
The reason Zen is "passing
beyond our logical comprehension"
is not because it is irrational, but because its epistemology rejects
concepts and operates on experiences
such as sensation
and perception only. Tried to empty your mind of all concepts and
then tried to understand yourself and the world with sensation and
perception only and
you will have a taste of the Zen experience.
A better description of this theory is "a-rational".
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 22):
"Now,
the monk who asked this question wished to know if there were
anything specifically to be known as the truth of Zen, which is
absolutely beyond human understanding. The four propositions are: (1)
affirmative, (2) negative, (3) neither affirmative nor negative, and
(4) both affirmative and negative. The 'one
hundred negations',
which in fact refers to the one hundred and six negative statements
in the Lankavatara
sutra,
means a wholesale negation of all possible statements that can be
made of anything."
In
a two-valued logic, the four propositions exhaust all possible
affirmations and denials of a proposition. If you said to a Zen
master that the rose in front of you is red, and the Zen master
replied that it is the case that: (1) The rose is red, (2) The rose
is not red, (3) The rose is neither red nor not red, and (4) The rose
is both red and not red, then the Zen master is not being irrational.
The paradoxical claims by the Zen master are meant to convey the idea
that reality is non-conceptual and therefore all four propositions
are true (or not true).
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 24):
"There
is no doubt that the Zen method of dealing with its subjects is
unique in the history of thought. It makes no use of ideas or
concepts; it directly appeals to concrete experience. If the monk
fails to awaken in himself the consciousness of the truth thus
conveyed in the most practical, personal, and lively manner, he has
to wait for another opportunity. In the meantime he may go on roaming
in the wilderness of abstract thought."
7.
The Second Non-Conceptual Paradox: Logic
Since
logic
is
conceptual
and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts
in his epistemology, Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot use any genuine logical
argumentation and cannot appraise any arguments as either valid or
invalid. What appears to be logical argumentation are considered by
Suzuki to be verbalism for
convenience.
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 26-27):
"Another
unique factor in the Zen method of teaching is what is known as
mondo.
The disciple asks a question (mon)
and the master answers (to
or do),
but sometimes this is reversed; and the answer is not always given in
words. For this questioning and answering is carried on in the region
of concrete thinking, and not in that of abstraction and
ratiocination. There is no lengthy exchange of words between master
and disciple, no discursive argument. The mondo generally stops with
the master's
pithy, epigrammatic statement, or his physical display of force, and
never leads to a serial development of logical subtleties. If the
disciple should fail to comprehend the master at once, he beats a
retreat, and that is the finish of the personal interview."
"Zen
never commits itself to conceptualization; it lives in aesthetic or
intuitive apprehension, and its truth is always demonstrated by means
of personal contact, which is the signification of mondo. The
knocking down, or the slapping of the face, or other various acts of
'rudeness'
or violence, are the outcome of the personal contact. It may appear
strange that the understanding of Zen issues out of these deeds, but
as long as Zen is not based on logical reasoning and conceptual
persuasion, its understanding must come from the personal experience
itself, and it must be understood that by personal experience is
meant not only the experience of the sense-world but that of events
taking place in one's
psychological realm."
Suzuki
([1953] 1955, 152-3):
"When
the gist of these Zen mondo
is replaced more or less by modern phraseology, we may have something
like the following:"
"We
generally reason: 'A'
is 'A'
because 'A'
is 'A';
or 'A'
is 'A',
therefore, 'A'
is 'A'.
Zen agrees or accepts this way of reasoning, but Zen has its own way
which is ordinarily not at all acceptable. Zen would say: 'A'
is 'A'
because
'A'
is not 'A';
or 'A'
is not 'A';
therefore, 'A'
is 'A'."
"Our
thinking on the worldly level is: Everything has its cause; nothing
is without its cause; the causation works on and in all things. But
Zen will agree with some Christians when they declare that God
created the world out of nothing, or that God willed and the world
came into
existence, or that 'To
say that God created the world
yesterday or tomorrow would be foolishness, for God created the world
and everything in it in the one present Now.'
"
"Mathematics
has this: 0=0, 1=1, 1+1=2, and so on. Zen has these too, but it has
no objection to the following either: 0=1, 0=2, 1 +1=3, etc. Why?
Because zero is infinity and infinity is zero. Is this not irrational
and beyond our comprehension?"
These
paradoxical claims in logic and mathematics by Suzuki's
are not that paradoxical if one remembers that according to Suzuki,
reality is non-conceptual and therefore a-rational. Since reality is
a-rational, we can verbally talk about reality in either a rational
or an
irrational
way. The verbal talks are not meant to make genuine
truth
claims about reality but are verbalism
for convenience.
8.
The Third Non-Conceptual Paradox: Language
Since
spoken
and written languages
are
conceptual
and since D. T. Suzuki rejects concepts
in his epistemology, Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism, by its own theory, cannot use any spoken and written
languages to make genuine
truth
claims, logical
arguments,
or to communicate conceptual information. What appears to be spoken
and written languages are considered by Suzuki to be verbalism for
convenience.
Suzuki
([1949] 1991, 15):
"The
original idea of Hui-neng was, of course, to do away with verbalism
and literature, because Mind can only be comprehended by mind
directly and without a medium."
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 17-18):
"A
gardener-monk once approached the master and wanted to be enlightened
on Zen. The master said, 'Come
again when there is nobody around, and I’ll tell you what it is.'
The following day the monk came in again, observed that there was
nobody around, and implored him to reveal the secret. The master
said, 'Come
closer to me,'
and the monk moved forward as told. The master said, 'Zen
is something that cannot be conveyed by word of mouth.'
"
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 30-31):
"While
Zen emphatically asserts the all-importance of personal contact, it
does not ignore the privilege of conceptualization granted only to
the human mind; that is to say, Zen will also resort to verbalism.
But what distinguishes Zen conspicuously from other spiritual
teachings is its assuming perfect mastery over words or concepts.
Instead of becoming a slave to them, it is aware of the role they
play in human experience, and assigns them to the place to which they
properly belong."
"Man
is homo sapiens and also homo faber; but the greatest
danger is apt to court in his capacity as homo faber is that
he becomes a slave to his own creations. Man makes many tools and
uses them effectively in various fields of his activity, but he is
always exposing himself to the tyranny of the tools he has made. The
result is that he is no more master of himself, but an abject slave
to his surroundings, and the worst thing is that he is not conscious
of this fact."
"This
is specially noticeable in the realm of thought. He has created many
valuable concepts by which he has learnt to handle realities. But he
now takes concepts for realities, thought for experience, system for
life. He forgets that concepts are his own creations, and by no means
exhaust reality. Zen is fully conscious of this, and all its mondo
are directed towards casting off the false mask of conceptualization.
It is for this reason that Zen looks so irrational, and smudges our
common-sense picture of the world."
Thus,
it is seen that D. T. Suzuki is realistic towards experience and
anti-realistic towards concepts. Concepts are regarded as created by
human beings and imposed on reality. Truth claims, logic, and
languages, being conceptual in nature, are regarded as instruments to
be used to handle and navigate about reality. Different human groups
have invented different concepts and there is a conventional aspect
to concepts as instruments.
9.
The Nature of D. T. Suzuki's Second-Order Discourses
A
theory is proposed to explain the world or reality. Since reality is
complex and many-sided, a theory is usually focused on just some
aspects of reality for explanation. A theory that is about some
aspects of the world or reality is a first-order theory. According to
D. T. Suzuki's first-order theory of knowledge, reality is
non-conceptual. Since reality is non-conceptual, there are no genuine
truth claims, logical arguments, or spoken and written languages
about reality. All these are just conventional instruments one uses
to elicit experiences and navigate about reality. They are verbalism
for convenience.
But
D. T. Suzuki does not just offer us a first-order theory of knowledge
about reality, he also talks about and explains his theory. These
talks or discourses are his explanations of his first-order theory
and they constitute his second-order theory. In these second-order
explanations of his first-order theory, D. T. Suzuki is making many
truth claims and logical arguments. These truth claims and logical
arguments are prohibited by the non-conceptual nature of his
first-order theory. When Suzuki uses the predicate "true"
or its cognates in either his first- or second-order theories, we
must remember that there are no genuine truth claims in Suzuki’s
world since for him reality is non-conceptual. In reading the
predicate "true", the readers may have the illusion that
Suzuki is making truth claims when he is not.
Suzuki
([1953] 1955, 141-142):
"In
many cases such mind prefer silence to verbalism or what we may call
symbolism to intellectualization. They do not like to risk any form
of misunderstanding, for they know that the finger is quite liable to
be taken for the moon. The Zen master, generally speaking, despises
those who indulge in word- or idea- mongering, and in this respect Hu
Shih and myself are great sinners, murderers of Buddhas and
patriarchs; we are both destined for hell."
10.
A Summary Contrast of Three Positions on Concepts
What
is the explanatory relationship
between sensation,
perception
and conception? The
following
summarily contrast three
answers to this question.
The positions of Gordon Clark and the logical empiricists may be
regarded as
the two poles of a continuum and the
positions of D. T. Suzuki may instructively be contrasted
with
them.
The
first position is that of Gordon Clark. The
chief characteristic of Clark's
epistemology in this regard is
that sensation and perception is to be explained in terms of
conception. Specifically, sensation and perception is to
be interpreted
and explained by truth, which is conceptual. The motivation for this
are the doctrines of the Eternal Decree of God and Creation. God
created the world according to His plan and the plan of God for
creation is consisted of the truths He has decreed from eternity to
be true. God's
plan for creation is exhaustive and therefore included our every
sensations and perceptions. Thus, our sensations and perceptions are
to be explained by the truths God has decreed to be true.
The
second position is that of the logical empiricists. Like D. T.
Suzuki, the epistemology of the logical
empiricists
are experience based. Whereas the theory of knowledge of the logical
empiricists are limited to sensory experiences and their extension
through scientific instruments, Suzuki's
is not. This is because most of the logical empiricists are
materialists and have background in the sciences and mathematics and
are therefore skeptical towards non-sensory experiences. Thus, in
common with the Western empirical tradition, the logical empiricists
begin
their
theory
of knowledge with sensation. The human mind "somehow"
organized the sensation into perception, and the mind "somehow"
further
abstracted
concepts
from perception. A
perennial problem for the logical empiricists is how to reach logical
and mathematical truths from sensation. As a longtime critic of
empiricism, Gordon Clark has repeatedly asked
the empiricists to explain their theory of perception and
abstraction. "Philosophers
who insist on giving a role to sensation in the acquisition of
knowledge should first define sensation, then show how sensation can
become perception, and presumably how memory images can produce
universal concepts by abstraction. If this is not their scheme, and
it might not be, then they should describe in detail what their
scheme is. It is not enough to speak vaguely about some role or
other."
(Clark 1979, 144). For logical empiricism, concepts are developed
from sensation and perception and are to be explained by them. (cf.
Rudolph Carnap failed attempt in The
Logical Structure of the World
([1928] 2005).)
The
third
position is that of D. T. Suzuki. The
two characteristics of Suzuki's
theory of knowledge in this regard are: (a) Suzuki's
epistemology embraces both sensory and non-sensory experiences, and
(b) Suzuki regards
all concepts
as
conventional or instrumental symbols which the human minds impose on
reality.
Since
truth is conceptual and since the only known bearers of truth and
falsity are propositions, this conventional or instrumental view of
concepts results in many paradoxes. The paradoxes are signs that
there are something wrong with Suzuki's
theory. Suzuki may be regarded as a radical empiricist that is
realistic towards experiences but anti-realistic towards concepts. In
the posthumously published SENGAI
The Zen Master,
Suzuki wrote: "Zen
always wishes to keep itself as close as possible to Reality, so that
it will never wander out into the world of concepts or symbols."
(Suzuki 1971, 1)
Table
7: Summary of the Three Explanatory Positions
Sensation
|
Perception
|
Conception
|
|
| Gordon Clark |
✔
|
✔
|
✔
|
| Explanatory direction: (← ) From Conception to Sensation | |||
| Logical Empiricism |
✔
|
✔
|
✔
|
| Explanatory direction: (→ ) From Sensation to Conception | |||
| D. T. Suzuki |
✔
|
✔
|
❌
|
Explanatory
direction: Not applicable
|
|||
C.
The Second Epistemological
Strand: The Irrational
Aspect of D. T. Suzuki's
Theory
In
Part B, it has
been shown
that D. T. Suzuki negatively
rejects
concepts in his epistemology. In Part C, it will be shown that Suzuki
positively
accepts
experiences as his exclusive epistemological objects of knowledge.
For
this essay, experience is the genus that is
consisted
of the two species sensory experience and non-sensory experience.
Sensory experience include such items as sensations and perceptions:
what we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Non-sensory experience
include such items as mystical experiences, religious experiences,
and emotional experiences.
11.
Epistemological versus Ontological Objects of Knowledge
Epistemological
objects of knowledge are that which we know in our minds and are
mental. Ontological objects of knowledge are that which we know about
in
the
world outside
and in
ourselves
inside.
There are two theories as
to
what are the epistemological objects of knowledge: Experiences and
truths. In some
theories
where experiences are the epistemological objects of knowledge, such
as D. T. Suzuki's,
experiences are regarded as in direct contact with reality and truths
(concepts) as something our minds impose on it. Thus, a realism
towards experiences and anti-realism
towards truths and concepts. In some theories where truths are the
epistemological objects of knowledge, such as Gordon Clark's,
truths are regarded as that which interprets reality. There is a
realism towards both experiences and truths.
The
following Diagram uses the sensory experience of a rose as an example
but it is meant to be illustrative of experiences in general.
We
will not go into the relationships between the epistemological and
ontological objects of knowledge. But different theories need not
disagree about the what are the ontological objects of knowledge even
if they disagree about what are the epistemological objects of
knowledge. Also, different
theories that agree about what are the ontological objects of
knowledge need not agree as to the nature
of those ontological objects. Thus, in D. T. Suzuki's
ontology, the ontological objects are things that are
interdependently co-arise from emptiness. In Gordon Clark's
ontology, the ontological objects of knowledge are of two kinds: God
and His creation.
| Epistemological Objects of Knowledge | Nature of the Ontological Objects | |
Gordon
Clark
|
Truths
(i.e. propositions)
|
Two
kinds: God and His creation
|
| D. T. Suzuki | Experiences | Interdependently co-arise from emptiness |
12.
D. T. Suzuki Rejects the Subject-Object Distinction Because of
Monistic Pantheism
Like
the Indian Buddhism from which it originated, D. T. Suzuki's
theory of knowledge abhors dualism and favors monism. Because
of monistic pantheism, the Subject-Object
Distinction is regarded by Suzuki as
something invented by the human minds and not something inherent in
reality. Gordon Clark's
theory of knowledge, on the other hand, because of the doctrine of
Creation, favors the Subject-Object
Distinction.
Suzuki
([1949] 1991, 78-79):
"CHIH:
'Do
you know that it is because of erroneous discrimination that one
conceives of a being, and hence the separation of subject and object.
This is known as a confused view. For in accordance with this view
one is involved in complexities and falls into the path of birth and
death. Those with a clearer insight are not like this one. Seeing may
go on all day, and yet there is nothing seen by them. You may seek
for traces of seeing in them, but nothing, either of the Body or of
the Use, is discoverable here. The duality of subject and object is
gone – which is called the seeing into Self-nature.'
"
"It
is evident that this seeing into self-nature is not an ordinary
seeing, in which there is a duality of one who sees and that which is
seen. Nor is it a special act of seeing, which, ordinarily
understood, takes place at a definite moment and in a definite
locality. Nevertheless there is the fact of seeing which cannot be
gainsaid. How can such a fact take place in this world of dualities?
As long as we cling, to use Buddhist terminology, to this way of
thinking, we can never comprehend this Zen experience of seeing into
the self-nature. To understand it one must have the experience, and
at the same time there must be a specially constructed logic or
dialectic – by whatever name it may be known – to give to the
experience a rational or an irrational interpretation. The fact comes
first, followed by an intellectualization. Chih of Yun-chu has done
his best in the above quotation to express his idea of seeing
according to the way of thinking which then prevailed. This
expression may fail to satisfy our present logical demand, but that
has nothing to do with the fact itself."
The
purport fact of "seeing
into self-nature"
is
just that, a purported fact.
How
can Suzuki writes "nevertheless
there is the fact of seeing which cannot be gainsaid"
when
so many of us ordinarily mortals
do not have this experience of seeing into self-nature and do indeed
gainsay
it? It
is a
special
pleading when Suzuki writes "to
understand it one must have the experience, and at the same time
there must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic".
The
Four Sacred Verses of
Bodhidharma
(Chinese:
達摩四聖句)
(translated
by Piya Tan):
A
special [separate] transmission outside the teachings (教外別傳),
do
not depend on written words (不立文字),
directly
point to the human mind (直指人心),
see
one's nature and become Buddha (見性成佛).
When
D. T. Suzuki writes on "satori"
(Chinese: 悟)
and "seeing
into self-nature"
(Chinese:
見性),
he
is writing on some of the most central ideas of Chan and Zen
Buddhism. They
function
similarly to Nicene
theology or
Chalcedonian
christology in orthodox Christianity.
13.
The Satori Experience as a Perfect Being Theory of
Knowledge
Those
who have
read some
Christian theology may be aware of "perfect
being theology".
While biblical and systematic theology are based on exegesis of the
Bible, "perfect
being theology"
is philosophically motivated. "One
prominent methodological strand of philosophical theology is perfect
being theology,
in which the nature of God is made more explicit by identifying God
as an absolutely perfect being and working out what features an
absolutely perfect being must exhibit".
(Murphy
2014)
The
theory of knowledge that lies behind the
Satori experience, which is so central to
D. T. Suzuki's Zen
Buddhism, may be construed as an experience based epistemology where
the knower is omniscient – a perfect being theory.
The theory is also underlies by monistic
pantheism. The followings
are continuous quotation from pages 46 to 49 of Suzuki's
Living by Zen
([1950] 1991) with headlines added.
(a)
The Satori Experience is Essential to Understanding Zen
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 46):
"To
understand Zen, it is essential to have an experience known as
Satori, for without this one can have no insight into the truth of
Zen, which, as we have already seen, is generally paradoxically
expressed:"
"When
snow covers all the mountains white, why is one left uncovered
(literally, not white)?"
"The
ascetic, pure in heart, does not enter Nirvana (i.e. Paradise); the
monk violating the Precepts does not fall into Hell."
"What
I know, you do not know; what you know, I know all."
"While
the post is moving around all day, how is it that I do not know?"
"How
is it that a man of great strength cannot lift his legs?"
(b)
Satori Makes Intelligible Statements Defy Being Fitted into
the Frame of Logical Reasonableness
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 46):
"All
these statements defy being fitted into the frame of
logical reasonableness. To make
them intelligible satori is
needed. They are in fact purposely set forth by Zen
masters to confuse those minds whose
field of operation cannot
go beyond our everyday common-sense experience.
When satori is attained the
irrationalities cease to be such;
they fall back on the level of logic and commonsense.
The hunter is said not to know the mountain
because he is right in them. He has to
be up in the air to see
the whole range of the undulations."
(c)
Monistic Pantheism Underlies the Satori
Experience
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 46-47):
"Satori
achieves
this feat; it detaches a man from his
environment, and makes him survey
the entire field. But this
does not mean that satori keeps him away from the
field where it operates. This is a
dualistic way of interpreting
satori, for a genuine satori is at once transcendent
and imminent.
It becomes really operative at the point where
subject is object and object is subject.
Or we can say
that unless
this identity
is effected there is no satori. In
satori what
is imminent is transcendent and what is transcendent
is imminent. The hunter is at once out of the mountains
and in them, for he has never gone one step away
from them."
(d)
Satori is a Concrete Experience and not
an Abstract Conception
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 47):
"We
must remember, however, that satori is not a mere intellectual
discipline; nor is it a kind of dialectic whereby contradictoriness
becomes logically tenable and turns into a reasonable proposition.
Satori is existential and not dialectical, as Kierkegaard may say. It
does not work with logical formulas and abstractions. It is a
concrete fact in itself. When it states that the waters do not flow
but the bridge does, it is, to men of satori, not a paradox but a
direct statement of their living existential experience. Kierkegaard
says that faith is an existential leap. So is satori. Faith has a
Christian ring, while satori is specifically Zen. In my view both are
experientially identifiable."
(e)
Field of Experience as
Continuum and Postulation
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 47):
"What
is given us primarily, immediately, is a continuum which is not
divisible into atoms; but as we ‘experience’ it, it divides
itself into an infinity of atoms. This is due to our sense
limitations and to the construction of consciousness. We do not
ordinarily reflect on this fact and
go
on with our daily life, taking sensual-intellectual facts of
experience for finalities. Those who reflect, however, build up a
world of concepts, and postulate a continuum. But as this is the
result of intellectual deliberation the continuum is not apprehended
as such by most of us."
(f)
Satori as Omniscient: An
All-Embracing
Whole Must
be Directly
Grasped as
a Whole
Complete in
Itself. The
Continuum is both Infinitely Cumulative
and Infinitely Divided
Suzuki
([1950] 1991, 47-49):
"To
us, therefore, God is not an object of immediate experience. He is
inferred by logical process. He is thought of, he is not seen. From
thinking to seeing is not a continuous process, it is a leap. For
however much we multiply our atomic experiences of parts, no
continuum as a concrete whole will be experienced. The concrete whole
is to be intuited as such. The whole is not to be apprehended by
accumulations; a whole thus arrived at is no
more
than parts added, and however far we may carry
this addition it goes on ad
infinitum. An
all-embracing
whole must be directly grasped as a whole complete in
itself. But if it is grasped in the way in which parts, atomic parts,
are grasped, it ceases to be a whole, it turns to be a part of the
whole which, as an infinitely expansible totality, for ever eludes
our prehension, which is postulationally conditioned."
"Therefore,
the continuum, undivided, indivisible, infinitely cumulative, and yet
a concrete object of apprehension, cannot belong to the world of
particulars. It belongs to another order of existence; it constitutes
a world by itself, and it is attainable only by transcending our
everyday experience of sense- intellect, that is, by an existential
leap. This is satori."
"It
is thus seen that satori is the apprehending of the
continuum as such, as not subject to differentiation
and determination. But the continuum thus apprehended as the object,
as it were, of satori experience ought not to be judged as standing
against particular objects of our daily experience. When this way of
thinking is cherished, satori is no more satori; it turns to be one
of sense-experiences, and creates a new continuum over the one we
already have,
and we shall have to repeat this process indefinitely."
"Another
important thing to remember is that satori takes in the continuum not
only as undifferentiated and undeterminated but as infinitely divided
and determinated. This means that satori is never in conflict with
the world of sense-intellect, it never negates its experiences. When
it declares that the spade is in my hands and yet I am empty-handed,
it does not mean to contradict the fact of the spade's actually being
in the hands, but it only means that each single fact of experience
is to be relate to the totality of things, for thereby it gains for
the first time its meaning."
14.
A
Criticism of D.
T. Suzuki's
Theory of Satori Experience
How
does one criticize the satori experience of D. T. Suzuki effectively?
A common distinction in criticism is between internal versus external
criticism. Internal criticism is criticism from a standpoint within a
theory and external criticism is criticism from a standpoint outside
the theory. It is generally agreed that internal criticism is more
effective than external criticism. For example, a protestant sharing
certain common assumptions with a catholic may be more effective in
his criticism of that catholic using their shared assumptions than a
Buddhist criticizing a catholic using Buddhist assumptions.
Principal
among internal criticism is criticizing the logical coherence of a
theory. The basis of logical criticism is that it is irrational or
absurd to
accept two truth claims that are inconsistent with each other. The
law
of non-contradiction
applies
and irrationalities
or
absurdities are bad
and to be avoided. If
it is shown that two assumptions of a theory or their implications
cannot both be
true,
then a theory has been effectively criticized. The theory has to be
revised in some ways or be abandoned. But logical criticism of the
satori experience is not effective since it is avowedly
non-conceptual. In fact, in Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism, the satori experience is fundamental and theories are
invented after the experience to justify
the experience. "To
understand it one must have the experience, and at the same time
there must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic – by
whatever name it may be known – to give to the experience a
rational or an irrational interpretation. The fact comes first,
followed by an intellectualization."
(Suzuki
[1949] 1991, 79)
Another
internal criticism is challenging the explanatory adequacy of the
theory for the data. This line of criticism is also ineffective
against the satori experience for the same reason above. The satori
experience comes first and any theory that interprets or explains the
experience is invented after to rationalize the experience, whether
the theory be rational or irrational.
If
there are no effective rational criticisms against the satori
experience itself, maybe the best we can do is to criticize the
theories that purport to rationally explain the satori experience. In
so far as the explanatory theory is meant as a rational theory, it is
subject to the canon of rational criticism. If all the extent
rational theories of the satori experience is effectively criticized
and only irrational theories are left, maybe the satori experience is
irrational after all and not just a-rational.
There
are many rational criticisms of D.
T. Suzuki's
theory
of the satori experience but I have the
space
to pursue only
one
of
them.
The
criticism is that if his
theory is true, then the satori experience is not realizable by human
beings. Recall that having the satori experience means "an
all-embracing
whole
must be directly grasped as a whole complete in
itself"
(Suzuki
[1950] 1991, 48) The
all-embracing whole maybe either infinite or finite. If the
all-embracing whole is infinite, then the
satori experience as theorized by Suzuki requires
a human person to "be"
an
omniscient being
and
no finite human beings can be omniscient. Notice
that Suzuki's
theory does not mean that a person having
some conceptions
of infinity is
sufficient for the satori experience.
Anyone with an introductory course in calculus will have some
conceptions of the infinitely small and anyone with an introductory
course in set theory will have some conceptions of the infinitely
large. But it takes a perfect being to directly grasped, in
one
experience, an
infinite,
all-embracing
whole as a whole in itself and human beings
are not perfect beings.
What
if the "all-embracing
whole"
is finite like our physical universe? In this
case, our universe is larger than human beings by
such an extent that
it
is not possible for us
to grasp our physical universe "as
a whole complete in itself".
Again, Suzuki's
theory is not realizable by any
human
beings. As
our knowledge of
the physical universe increases,
what constitutes a
finite "all-embracing
whole"
becomes
larger and larger and there is a drive towards omniscient to realize
the satori experience. If
Suzuki's theory is not realizable by any human beings, then according
to his theory no human beings can
have the
satori experience.
D.
The Hu Shih – D. T. Suzuki Exchange of
1953
15.
Introducing the 1953 Exchange
Hu
Shih (1891-1962) (family name: Hu) was a Chinese scholar equal in
stature with D. T. Suzuki. Hu received his doctorate in philosophy
under John Dewey at Columbia University in New York in the 1910s.
Among his many interests, Hu had done original textual studies on the
manuscripts of the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch newly
discovered at Dunhuang in the early 20th Century. Like his teacher
Dewey, Hu was a pragmatist.
In
1953, D. T. Suzuki had an exchange with Hu Shih in the April
issue of the journal
Philosophy
East and West.
The exchange was
initiated by
Hu's
criticism and ended with Suzuki's
response. See:
(Hu 1953) and (Suzuki 1953). Citations
are from the reprints (Hu [1953] 2013) and (Suzuki [1953]
1955). There
are three subsequent responses to the 1953
Hu
Shih-D.
T. Suzuki
Exchange
in Philosophy
East and West alone:
(a)
Van
Meter Ames's
"Zen
and Pragmatism"
(1954), (b) Arthur
Waley's
"History
and Religion"
(1955), and (c) James D. Sellmann's
"A
Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki"
(1995).
16.
Is Zen Buddhism Irrational?
The
initial position of the Exchange is set by Hu Shih ([1953] 2013,
235-236):
"As
a friend and as a historian of Chinese thought, I have followed
Suzuki's work with keen interest. But I have
never concealed from him my disappointment in his method of approach.
My greatest disappointment has been that, according to Suzuki and his
disciples, Zen is illogical, irrational, and, therefore, beyond
our intellectual understanding. In his book Living
by Zen
Suzuki tells us:"
"If
we are to judge Zen from our common-sense view of things, we shall
find the ground sinking
away under our feet. Our so-called rationalistic way of thinking has
apparently no use in evaluating the truth or untruth of Zen. It is
altogether beyond the ken of human understanding. All that we can
therefore state about Zen is that its uniqueness lies in its
irrationality or its passing beyond our logical comprehension."
"It
is this denial of the capability of the human intelligence to
understand and evaluate Zen that I emphatically
refuse to accept. Is the so-called Ch'an or
Zen really
so illogical and irrational that it is 'altogether
beyond the ken of human understanding' and
that our rational or rationalistic way of thinking is of no use 'in
evaluating the truth and untruth of Zen'?"
As
a historian, Hu Shih proceeds to defend the rationality of Chinese
Chan by expositing on the history of Chan Buddhism, especially its
pedagogical method, which on the surface seems illogical.
D.
T. Suzuki begins his response ([1953] 1955, 135):
"One
of my first impressions after reading Dr. Hu Shih's
learned and instructive paper on Zen Buddhism in China is
that he may know a great deal about history but nothing about the
actor behind it. History is a kind of public property accessible to
everybody who is at liberty to handle it according to his judgment.
To this extent history is something objective, and its materials or
facts, though these are quite an indefinite element in the make-up of
history, are like scientific objects ready to be examined by the
students. They are not, of course, subject to planned experiments. On
the other hand, the actor or creator, the man who is behind history,
eludes the historian's
objective handling. What constitutes his individuality or
subjectivity cannot be made the object of historical investigation,
because it refuses to manifest itself objectively. It can be
appreciated only by himself.
His is a unique existence which can never be duplicated, and this
uniqueness in its metaphysical sense, or in its deepest sense, can be
intuited only by the man himself.
It is not the historian's
business to peer into it. In fact, however much he may try, he will
always be frustrated in his attempt. Hu Shih fails to understand
this."
Suzuki
([1953] 1955, 136-137):
"My
contention is twofold: (1) Zen is not explainable by mere
intellectual analysis. As long as the intellect is concerned
with words and ideas, it can never reach Zen. (2) Even when Zen is
treated historically, Hu Shih's way
of setting it in a historical frame is not correct, because he fails
to understand what Zen is. I must
strongly
insist that Zen must first be comprehended as it is in itself; only
then can one proceed to the study of its
historical objectifications, as Hu Shih does."
What
is interesting about D. T. Suzuki's
entire reply to Hu Shih is that Suzuki never attempted to rebut Hu by
saying that Hu has misunderstood him when
quoting
"all
that we can therefore state about Zen is that its uniqueness lies in
its irrationality or its passing beyond our logical comprehension."
Yet
Suzuki seems to
be very
upset when Hu quoted Suzuki's
own
words against
him about
the irrationality of Zen and with Hu's
attempts to show the rationality of Chinese Chan through historical
analysis.
My
reading of the 1953 Exchange is that both Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki
have misunderstood Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism. Suzuki has incorrectly characterized his own position
as irrational when it
is in
fact a-rational. If reality is non-conceptual and therefore
a-rational, and if verbal talks are not meant to make genuine truth
claims about reality but are verbalism
for convenience,
then the verbal talks about reality can be either rational or
irrational. Why is Suzuki upset with Hu when by Suzuki's
own position Hu has done what is perfectly permissible? Suzuki
is upset because he has misunderstood his own position as irrational.
My
reading of the a-rationality of D. T. Suzuki's
Zen Buddhism is corroborated
by James
D. Sellmann (1995, 99): "Both
Hu and Suzuki have misrepresented 'Zen,'
for it is neither logical nor illogical, but alogical."
E.
A Clarkian Explanation of the A-Rationality and
Irrationality of the Epistemology of D. T. Suzuki
Part
E will outline a Clarkian Theory of Knowledge and will
briefly
shows that it is immune from the criticisms level against D.
T. Suzuki's.
The
theses of the theory are not all personal views of Gordon Clark but
involve some conservative extensions of his positions. Following that
is a recapitulation of what
is epistemologically wrong with the intuition lying behind
Suzuki's
theory
of knowledge.
17.
Twenty-Four Theses of a Clarkian Theory of Knowledge
What
are the Epistemological Objects of Knowledge?
Thesis
1 : The epistemological objects of knowledge are truths.
Thesis
2 : The only known bearers of truth and falsity are propositions.
Thesis
3 : The epistemological objects of knowledge are propositions.
Thesis
4 : Percepts are neither true nor false and therefore are not
epistemological objects of knowledge.
Are
truths relative to conceptual schemes and perspectives?
Thesis
5 : Propositions are the bearers of both truth and meaning.
Thesis
6 : Truths are invariant with respect to the conceptual schemes and
perspectives in which they are expressed.
Thesis
7 : A proposition is individuated by its meaning.
Thesis
8 : The meaning of a proposition is dependent on the conceptual
schemes and perspectives in which it is expressed.
Thesis
9 : A change in meaning implies that a different proposition is being
individuated.
Thesis
10 : Percepts are bearers of meanings but not of truth and falsity.
Thesis
11 : The meanings of percepts are the propositions use to interpret
the percepts.
Thesis
12 : An interpretation of a percept is true if the meaning of the
interpreting proposition is part of the meanings of the corresponding
percept.
What
is the nature of truth?
Thesis
13 : Truths or propositions exist eternally and necessarily as the
objects of God's
conceptual thoughts.
Thesis
14 : Necessary truths are truths that refer to God-in-Himself.
Thesis
15 : Necessary truths do not depend on the Will of God but on the
nature of His being.
Thesis
16 : Contingent truths are truths that refer to God and His creation.
Thesis
17 : Contingent truths depend on the Will of God as to what He
decrees to create.
Thesis
18 : The necessity of God's
mind lies in that all propositions exist eternally and necessarily as
objects of God's
conceptual thoughts. (i.e.
A necessary proposition is necessarily necessary; a contingent
proposition is necessarily contingent.)
Thesis
19 : The freedom of God's
mind lies in that which among all the maximally consistent sets of
propositions He will bring about as the actual world is determined by
His will.
What
is the relationship between truths and creation?
Thesis
20 : God creates the world according to His plan.
Thesis
21 : God's
plan for creation is His Eternal Decree which is consisted of the
contingently true propositions He has determined to be true.
Thesis
22 : In creating, God brings about contingent actual states of
affairs from the contingently true propositions He has determined to
be true.
Thesis
23 : Contingent truths are grounded in the Eternal Decree of God and
their truth-markers are the actual states of affairs of Creation.
Thesis
24 : Truth interprets creation because creation is brought about from
truth.
18.
Some Implications of a Clarkian Theory for How Human Persons Know
Human
beings are the image of God and bear that image in knowledge and
morality.
Human
persons know by knowing some of the truths that God knows. God, being
omniscient, knows all truth. If God knows all truths and if we do not
know some of the truths that God knows, then we do not know at all.
When we know, we therefore
think
the identical propositions in God's
mind. Human beings, being finite image of God, only know some truths.
Although our knowledge is partial, it is true. How do we know some of
the truths that God knows? By reading the Holy Bible. The Bible is
the Word of God and it has many literary forms among which are
propositional truth claims. When rightly understood, these truth
claims and their logical consequences are true. Thus, humans can know
some of the truths God knows by
reading the Bible.
While
truths are God's
conceptual thoughts, logic is the way God thinks, and communication
is possible because we can all think some of the truths in God's
mind. Our
spoken and written languages are structures the human minds uses to
"tag"
the thoughts in God's
mind. Thus,
Gordon Clark's
theory of knowledge is immune from the criticisms level against D. T.
Suzuki's.
Diagram
D
: A Clarkian Epistemological Model
19.
A Fundamental Disagreement with D. T. Suzuki's
Theory of Knowledge
Aside
from D.
T.
Suzuki rejecting the Subject-Object Distinction, a fundamental
disagreement between Gordon Clark and Suzuki is about
what are
the
epistemological objects
of knowledge. According
to Clark, we know truths
or propositions;
according to Suzuki it is experiences.
But
unlike
the logical empiricists who tried to reach truths
from experiences,
Suzuki gives up on truths
or concepts
altogether. To Suzuki, concepts are instruments to elicit
experiences.
Despite
of himself, Suzuki
is not altogether wrong
because
experiences
are
meaningful. We can make truth claims, reason logically, and talk
rationally
about our experiences because all our experiences are brought about
from
the
truths God has determined to be true. Created
reality are inherently meaningful because it is brought about from
truths. Truth interprets creation because creation is brought
about from truth.
As
the Bible says: "By
faith we understand that the universe was created by the word of God,
so that what is seen was made from things that are not visible."
(Hebrews 11:3 CSB)
In
reading the many writings of D. T. Suzuki, I find him to be a very
intelligent person. One
virtue of Suzuki is that he tries to explain Zen Buddhism in a
rational manner. One vice is that his explanatory theories of Zen
contain many paradoxes and are
not
logically consistent. A reason for the paradoxes in his
writings is
because
they proceed from false assumptions. A
fundamental
false assumption in Suzuki's
theory is
the
claim that
the epistemological objects of
knowledge are
non-conceptual experiences
when what
we know are
conceptual truths.
Since
Suzuki purports to know non-conceptual experiences,
a consequence is that his theory when properly understood is
a-rational and indifferent between the rational and the irrational.
When
Suzuki writes ([1953] 1955, 153):
"Mathematics
has this: 0=0, 1=1, 1+1=2, and so on. Zen has these too, but it has
no objection to the following either: 0=1, 0=2, 1 +1=3, etc. Why?
Because zero is infinity and infinity is zero. Is this not irrational
and beyond our comprehension?"
I
find his theory of knowledge to be untenable.
F.
Conclusion
This
essay is in essentials an extension and application of Gordon Clark's
criticisms of empiricism to the Zen Buddhism of D. T. Suzuki. I
have partially
discharged
the intellectual debt I owe to Clark
by
explaining why I find the
Zen
Buddhism of
Suzuki untenable.
There
are many disagreements between Christian Theism and Pantheism, and
between Reformed Protestantism
and
Zen Buddhism. This essay has only scratch the surface of the
disagreements by following two strands
in the epistemological disagreements between Gordon H. Clark and D.
T. Suzuki.
References
Ames,
Van Meter. 1954. "Zen and Pragmatism". Philosophy East
and West 4, no. 1 (April): 19-33.
Carnap,
Rudolph. [1928] 2005. The Logical Structure of the World and
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Translated by Rolf A. George.
Chicago: Open Court.
Ch'en,
Kenneth. [1964] 1973. Buddhism
in China: A Historical Survey.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Clark,
Gordon H. [1952] 1981. A Christian View of Men and Things: An
Introduction to Philosophy. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book
House.
----------.
1956. What Presbyterians Believe. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
----------.
1965. What Do Presbyterians Believe? The Westminster Confession:
Yesterday and Today. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Company..
----------.
1979. Language and Theology. Phillipsburg, New Jersey:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
Geisler,
Norman L., and William D. Watkins. 1989. Worlds
Apart: A Handbook On World Views.
2nd ed. Grand
Rapids, Michigan:
Baker Book House.
Hu
Shih 胡適.
1953. "Ch'an
(Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method".
Philosophy East and West
3, no. 1 (April): 3-24.
----------.
[1953] 2013. "Ch'an
(Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method".
In English
Writings of Hu Shih, Vol.
2, Chinese Philosophy
and Intellectual History,
edited by Chih-P'ing
Chou, 235-254. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.
Humphreys,
Christmas. 2000. "Dr.
D. T. Suzuki (October 18, 1870-1970)".
In The Awakening of Zen
(Shambhala Dragon Editions),
edited by Christmas
Humphreys, x-xv. Boulder,
Colorado:
Shambhala Publications.
Jaffe,
Richard M. 2014. "Introduction".
In Selected Works of D.
T. Suzuki, Vol. 1,
Zen,
edited
by Richard M. Jaffe, xi-lvi.
Oakland,
California: University of California Press.
Liu,
JeeLoo 劉紀璐.
2006. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient
Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishing.
McRae,
John R. 2004. “Looking at Lineage: A Fresh
Perspective on Chan Buddhism”. In Seeing
through Zen: Encounter, Transformation, and Genealogy in Chinese Chan
Buddhism, 1-21. Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California: University of California Press.
Murphy,
Mark. 2014.
"Perfect
Goodness".
In
The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited
by Edward N. Zalta. Spring
2014 Edition.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/perfect-goodness/.
Sellmann,
James D. 1995. "A
Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki."
Philosophy East and West
45,
no. 1 (January):
97-104.
Suzuki,
Daisetsu (Daisetz) Teitaro
鈴木大拙貞太郎.
----------.
[1927]
2000. Essays in Zen
Buddhism: First Series.
New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
----------.
[1933] 2000. Essays in Zen Buddhism: Second Series. New Delhi:
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
----------.
[1934] 1964. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. New York: Grove
Press.
----------.
[1935] 2010. Manual of Zen Buddhism. Seattle: Pacific
Publishing Studio.
----------.
[1949] 1991. The
Zen Doctrine of No Mind.
Edited by Christmas
Humphreys. London: Rider Books.
----------.
[1950] 1991. Living by Zen: A Synthesis of the Historical and
Practical Aspects of Zen Buddhism. London: Rider Books.
----------.
1953. "Zen:
A Reply to Hu Shih".
Philosophy East and West
3, no. 1 (April): 25-46.
----------.
[1953] 1955. "Zen:
A Reply to Hu Shih".
In Studies in Zen, edited
by Christmas
Humphreys, 129-164. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.
----------.
[1956] 1996. Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki.
Edited by William Barrett. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
----------.
1958. Zen and Japanese Buddhism. Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau.
----------.
[1959] 1993. Zen and Japanese Culture. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
----------.
1971. Sengai: The Zen Master. Edited by Eva van Hoboken.
London: Faber and Faber.
----------.
1971. What is Zen? Two Unpublished Essays and a Reprint of the
First Edition of The Essence of Buddhism. London: The Buddhist
Society.
----------.
2014. Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki. Vol.
1, Zen.
Edited by Richard M. Jaffe. Oakland, California: University of
California Press.
----------.
2015. Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki. Vol.
2, Pure
Land. Edited by James C. Dobbins. Oakland, California: University
of California Press.
----------.
2016. Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki. Vol.
3, Comparative
Religion. Edited by Jeff Wilson and Tomoe Moriya. Oakland,
California: University of California Press.
Suzuki,
D. T., Erich Fromm, and Richard De Martino. 1960. Zen Buddhism &
Psychoanalysis. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Waley,
Arthur. 1955. "History
and Religion."
Philosophy East and West
5, no. 1 (April): 75-78.
End.
